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ABSTRACT
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metamemory
Pages in Study 155
Candidate for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Research has examined how encoding or retrieval factors affect metamemory.
Few studies have manipulated both an encoding and a retrieval factor in the same
paradigm. The current experiments examined which factor had a greater impact on
metamemory when both were manipulated. Attention was manipulated during encoding
and Retroactive Interference was manipulated at retrieval.
Two lists of word pairs were studied, with the second list including both new
pairs and cues from the first list re-paired with a new target. The attention manipulation
occurred when studying the first list in which participants denoted when one tone
sequence changed to another. Participants gave predictions about the likelihood of future
recall of the original targets either immediately following study (JOL) or in a separate
phase after studying all pairs (DJOL). The Modified Opposition Test (MOT) was used in
which a hint was used to direct participants to the correct list for recall. After all pairs
were studied and predicted, participants completed a cued-recall test.

In Experiment 1, DJOLs were used because they are collected between encoding
and retrieval. Both factors impacted memory, but DJOLs were only impacted by the
retrieval factor. A dissociation between memory and metamemory under retroactive
interference was expected and replicates prior research (Eakin, 2005). In Experiment 2,
JOLs were added; JOLs are measured during the encoding phase, allowing the impact of
the encoding factor to be observed. Replicating Experiment 1, memory was affected by
both the encoding and retrieval factor, but JOLs were impacted by the retrieval factor.
Another comparison using a standard cued-recall test instead of the MOT, showed that
JOLs were no longer influenced by the retrieval factor, but they still did not vary with
attention.
The results conclusively suggest that metamemory was not based on encoding
factors, even when the retrieval factor is not influencing the predictions. Koriat’s (1993,
1994) accessibility heuristic can explain these results. Predictions were based on how
much information came to mind when the prediction is made, regardless of whether that
information is correct. Furthermore, metamemory predictions are based on heuristics that
do not always follow memory outcomes.

Key words: metamemory predictions, DJOLs, JOLs, Attention, Retroactive Interference,
accessibility heuristic
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INTRODUCTION
Metamemory is broadly defined as one’s knowledge about one’s own memory
(Flavell, 1979) and one’s monitoring and control of one’s memory processes (Dunlosky
& Bjork, 2008). That is, metamemory processes inform and monitor memory processes
to such a degree that metamemory controls memory at encoding by allocating strategies
we use to learn new information and at retrieval by determining whether a memory
search will be initiated. Research on metamemory typically examines metamemory
processes and their impact on memory by having participants study information and
make predictions—either before or after a retrieval attempt—about how well they will
remember that information later. Participants’ predictions are then compared to their
actual memory performance to determine how accurate they are in their assessment of
their own memory.
Although metamemory processes influence memory processes both at encoding
and retrieval, the majority of research has focused the theoretical bases of metamemory
predictions made when factors that affect encoding are manipulated. For example,
researchers have examined the impact of semantic relatedness (Koriat & Bjork, 2005),
overlearning (Carroll & Nelson, 1993; Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr, &
Narens, 1982), repetition (Hertzog, Dunlosky, & Sinclair, 2010), levels of processing and
study time (Lupker, Harbluk, & Patrick, 1991), and divided attention (Barnes &
1

Dougherty, 2007; Sacher, Taconnat, Souchay, & Isingrini, 2009) on predictions; each of
these factors will be discussed in detail below. Although the memory literature has
established the impact of the interaction between factors affecting encoding and retrieval
on memory, few metamemory studies have investigated the theoretical bases of
metamemory predictions when factors that affect retrieval are manipulated, let alone
when both encoding and retrieval are manipulated (but see Schreiber, 1998, Experiments
2 & 3; Schreiber & Nelson, 1998).
Those studies that have examined factors affecting the retrieval process have
tested the impact of retrieval practice (King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980),
associative set size (Eakin & Hertzog, 2012b; Schreiber, 1998; Schreiber & Nelson,
1998) and different types of interference, including proactive interference (Metcalfe,
Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993; Wahlheim, 2011), related competitors (Rhodes & Tauber,
2011), and retroactive interference (Eakin, 2005) on metamemory. Although
implemented during the encoding process, these factors are considered factors at retrieval
because the effects of these manipulations become evident during retrieval. What is not
apparent from a careful review of the literature is how factors manipulated at both
encoding and retrieval impact metamemory predictions, and what bases people use to
inform metamemory processes when there are conflicting manipulations at encoding and
retrieval in terms of their impact on memory. This examination is important because the
findings will serve to inform current theories on the bases of metamemory predictions.
In this paper, two experiments were conducted to investigate the theoretical bases
of metamemory predictions when factors affecting both encoding and retrieval processes
were manipulated within the same paradigm. Following a review of the typical procedure
2

for measuring and assessing metamemory, and a discussion of the current theoretical
viewpoints regarding the bases of metamemory predictions, I will present the current
literature that has examined factors affecting encoding and retrieval separately. The
discussion considers how current theories about the bases of metamemory predictions
explain results from these studies. First, however, a discussion of the metamemory
framework proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990) will provide the theoretical structure
for the paper.
Metamemory and the Metamemory Framework
Nelson and Narens (1990) developed a metamemory framework that has largely
influenced how researchers think about and study metamemory (see Figure 1). This
framework suggests that metamemory processes include two basic and interrelated
levels—the meta-level and the object-level—for which the meta-level is a mental
representation of the object-level, which is the memory process itself. In general,
information flows between the meta- and object-levels through the use of two processes,
monitoring and control. The monitoring component monitors the object-level, including
the degree to which information is learned and the likelihood of successful retrieval. The
meta-level’s representation is based on this monitoring of the object-level, and changes to
the representation at the meta-level results in modifications to the object-level via the
second metamemory process, control.
Based on the representation of the current state of the object-level as informed by
the monitoring processes, strategies are implemented from the meta-level to the objectlevel via the control process. Some of the control processes actions are to begin a search
process, change a learning strategy, or terminate encoding if the representation at the
3

meta-level is updated (via the monitoring process) to indicate learning is complete. The
monitoring component informs the meta-level, which informs control processes, which
impacts memory at the object-level. In this manner, metamemory processes are theorized
to direct memory processes, and failures in monitoring can result in failures to implement
predictable control processes on memory.
Nelson and Narens (1990) posited that there are control and monitoring processes
that occur at each memory process: acquisition (encoding), retention, and retrieval. They
specified unique monitoring and control processes that occur at each of the memory
processes. After the learner sets a learning goal (e.g., to learn for a test, to learn for 30
minutes, to learn for a lifetime) the memory processes begins; this process is monitored
and control processes implemented via metamemory, toward achievement of this goal.

Figure 1.

The metamemory framework (Adapted from Nelson & Narens, 1990).

The three stages of the memory process are between the horizontal lines, the monitoring
components are above the horizontal lines, and the control components are below the
horizontal line.
4

Encoding Process
The first memory process, then, is encoding. Prior to encoding, how difficult
information is to learn is monitored; this monitoring is operationalized as ease-oflearning (EOL) and measured using EOL predictions. Research has shown that EOLs
inform the control process of allocation of study time and encoding strategy selection
(Nelson & Leonesio, 1988; Underwood, 1966).
The goal of ongoing acquisition—or encoding—is that the to-be-remembered
information is learned in such a way as to meet the learning goal. During encoding, the
meta-level is continuously updated via the monitoring process to represent the changing
state of learning at the object-level. Specifically, the monitoring process is used to assess
the current state of learning at the object-level, leading to predictions about the to-beremembered information. The result of these predictions is that the meta-level is updated
about the state of memory at the object-level. These predictions can take two forms: a
judgment of learning (JOL) or a feeling of knowing (FOK; can also occur during
retrieval, see below). JOLs are implicitly formed during the encoding process, but
explicit predictions are collected immediately following encoding of information. FOKs
can be formed at encoding as well, but FOKs are given following a retrieval attempt. For
both types of predictions, as information is learned, immediate on-line monitoring
processes result in assessment of the degree of learning at the object-level. As the
monitoring process informs the meta-level, the meta-level continuously updates the
control processes operating on the object-level, such as terminating study if the prediction
is that learning has reached the desired level of mastery or allocating more time to
studying and/or implementing a new strategy, if the prediction is that the desired level of
5

mastery has not been achieved. This cycle is recursive and continuous, until the level of
learning for all words meets or exceeds the desired level of mastery (Nelson & Narens,
1990).
Retention Process
The second memory process proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990) to be
monitored by metamemory processes is retention, or the process of maintaining
previously learned information in memory for the subsequent memory test. Ebbinghaus
demonstrated the learning curve, showing that forgetting was a function of time
(Gilliland, 1948) and that forgetting was significant after a short period of time. Over
time, as the state of information in memory at the object-level changes, these changes are
monitored, and the meta-level is informed about the state of the object-level.
Retrieval Process
The final memory process proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990) is retrieval, or
the process of searching memory and outputting an answer. During retrieval, the state of
access to information from the object-level is monitored and this monitoring process is
measured by predictions such as delayed predictions of learning (DJOLs; described
below), FOKs, and Confidence Judgments (CJs; described below).
DJOLs are predictions made after some delay following encoding. Although some
researchers suggest that DJOLs are predictions about encoding (e.g., Dunlosky & Nelson,
1992, 1997; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011), others argue that DJOLs are formed during the
retention interval between encoding and retrieval, and are predictions about retrieval
(Eakin, 2005; Eakin & Hertzog, 2012b; Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003; Metcalfe & Finn,
6

2008). After a retention period, a retrieval cue is presented and a DJOL is given that
indicates how likely the correct target will be recalled during a future retrieval attempt.
The DJOL is one type of judgment that is part of the monitoring component that serves to
inform the meta-level about the current state of retrievability of information. Based on
this assessment, the meta-level initiates the control component to modify the object-level,
such as whether to begin searching memory.
Although FOKs can be used to assess monitoring at encoding, they can also be
collected during the retrieval process, but are typically given after a retrieval attempt. For
example, if a person studies FROG - TOAD, he might form a high FOK that he will
definitely remember TOAD when given FROG. During retrieval, when presented with
FROG, he might not be able to recall TOAD, and he might adjust his FOK. Then, when
he gives his numerical prediction, it might be lower than it was immediately following
encoding. FOKs are similar to DJOLs in that they are predictions about retrieval, but
FOKs are assessments made after a retrieval attempt, typically about later recognition of
information, whereas DJOLs are predictions made prior to recall.
Early research collected FOKs only on failed retrieval attempts (e.g., Hart, 1965,
1967; Koriat, 1993), but FOKs are now typically collected on all items, and later
analyzed for unrecalled items, so that participants are unable to use information about
their failed retrieval attempts to adjust their predictions. The FOK is part of the
monitoring system that informs the meta-level whether the cued information is in
memory. Based on this assessment, the meta-level sends the control process to inform the
object-level to initiate a search of memory. During this search process, the process is

7

monitored and FOKs are continuously adjusted to update the meta-level, which
implements updated control processes to continue or terminate the search.
CJs are predictions made after a potential answer is retrieved and outputted and is
an assessment of the likelihood that the retrieved answer is correct (Nelson & Narens,
1990). The CJ is given immediately following the retrieval attempt for each answer. For
example, a person might be given FROG and asked to recall the target (e.g., TOAD).
Immediately following giving an answer, the person gives a numerical judgment about
how likely he believes his given answer is correct. The CJ is part of the monitoring
system that informs the meta-level about the degree to which the memory search has
resulted in retrieval of the correct to-be-remembered information. If the monitoring
process indicates that the correct information has been retrieved, the meta-level initiates
the control process to update the object-level to terminate search; the person then outputs
his answer.
Metamemory Paradigm
Depending on the type of metamemory prediction being collected (e.g., JOL,
DJOL, FOK, etc.) metamemory is tested in slightly different ways. EOLs are collected
prior to the study phase such that the paradigm is: EOL-Study-Recall. JOLs are
predictions made immediately following encoding each individual word or word pair:
Study then JOL-Recall. DJOLs are collected after some delay following encoding. Most
of the time, DJOLs are collected in a separate phase following encoding; therefore, the
paradigm includes three distinct phases, Study-DJOL-Recall. FOKs are predictions made
following a retrieval attempt, meaning that they are collected after some test (e.g., cued
recall). The paradigm used to collect FOKs is: Study-Recall-FOK-Recognition. The
8

recognition test is a multiple-choice type test in which participants are given a cue and a
list of alternatives, one of which is the correct target, and they are to choose the correct
target. Finally, CJs are collected at the end of a paradigm, following all phases; the
paradigm is typically Study-Recall-CJ.
Measuring Metamemory
Metamemory predictions have been collected using several different types of
scales, including yes/no predictions (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969; Hart, 1965; Reder, 1987),
global predictions (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007), ranking predictions (Nelson et al., 1982;
Nelson, Gerler, & Narens, 1984), Likert-type scale predictions (e.g., 0-6; Carroll &
Nelson, 1993; Eakin, 2005; Hart, 1965, 1967; King et al., 1980; Leibert & Nelson, 1998;
Lovelace, 1984; Lupker et al., 1991; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Sacher et al., 2009), and
continuous scale predictions (e.g., 0-100; Dunlosky & Matvey, 2001; Eakin & Hertzog,
2012b; Koriat, 1993, 1995, 1997; Koriat & Bjork, 2005; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Rhodes &
Tauber, 2011; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992; Wahlheim, 2011). The continuous scale type
is now the most frequently used scale; this scale is typically from 0 to 100, with 0 =
definitely not be able to retrieve or recognize the correct answer and 100 = definitely will
be able to retrieve or recognize the correct answer.
Sensitivity
Metamemory predictions are assessed by examining metamemory sensitivity and
metamemory accuracy (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Metamemory sensitivity is
examined by determining whether there are differences in the mean magnitude of
predictions between experimental conditions and whether the pattern of response to
9

experimental conditions in metamemory matches the pattern in memory. This calculation
allows us to determine whether metamemory predictions are sensitive to manipulations
that affect memory. Whereas sensitivity measures metamemory in the aggregate,
metamemory accuracy is an item-by-item comparison between predicted and actual
memory.
Accuracy
Metamemory accuracy can be assessed by calculating absolute accuracy (e.g.,
calibration) or by calculating relative accuracy (e.g., resolution). Relative accuracy can be
assessed in a few different ways; two common ways are by calculating by-participant
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma Correlations or by using group-level mixed-effects modeling.
Calibration. One way to assess metamemory accuracy is by calculating absolute
accuracy—or calibration—or how well people are able to predict overall performance
(Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Calibration is calculated in two ways: by computing bias
and by plotting performance against prediction. The first calculation, bias, is computed
by subtracting overall recall percentage from overall prediction percentage (Dunlosky &
Metcalfe, 2009). For example, a predicted 50% of the words during recall and actual
recall of 50% would produce perfect calibration. Overconfidence is indicated when the
prediction percentage is higher than actual recall; underconfidence is indicated when the
prediction percentage is lower than actual recall.
The second calculation, plotting calibration curves, is done by plotting a person’s
actual test performance as a function of each level of prediction. For example, if the
experiment had six levels of prediction, 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%, then for
10

each level of the scale, the percentage of words correctly recalled would be calculated.
Therefore, if six words received a 0% rating, but three were answered correctly, a 50
would be plotted at the 0% space on the calibration curve, resulting in underconfidence at
this level. Once all levels of prediction are plotted, we can examine the overall pattern of
data and determine a person’s calibration with respect to perfect calibration.
Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation. Relative accuracy reflects how well a
person is able to discriminate among words he will and will not be able to retrieve or
recognize on an item-by-item level (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Relative accuracy can
be calculated by correlating a participant’s prediction for a target words with his actual
recall performance for that word. This calculation is conducted over all words, and is then
aggregated to determine the participant’s overall relative accuracy, a value known as a
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma correlation. Gamma correlations range from -1.0 to +1.0, with
correlations around zero indicating no correlation between predicted and actual recall.
Positive Gamma correlations indicate better accuracy, with a correlation of +1.0
indicating perfect accuracy. Negative Gamma correlations indicate a correlation, but with
metamemory and memory values going in the opposite direction; high predictions are
correlated with low recall and vice versa.
In metamemory research, the majority of researchers have focused on examining
how memory, metamemory sensitivity, and metamemory accuracy are impacted by
factors that affect the encoding process (e.g., Attention). Conversely, very little research
has been conducted examining how memory and metamemory are impacted by factors
that affect the retrieval process (e.g., Interference). Additionally, there has been virtually
no studies examining which type of factor people rely on when both encoding and
11

retrieval factors are implemented within the same paradigm. The experiments discussed
below were designed to provide some insight into the question of whether participants
use encoding factors, retrieval factors, or both as the basis of their metamemory
predictions when both factor types are manipulated at the same time.
To examine this question, a factor that affects the encoding process, Attention,
was crossed with a factor that affects the retrieval process, Retroactive Interference.
Participants studied a list of related cue-target word pairs under either full or divided
attention; then, they studied another list of related cue-target word pairs on which half the
pairs shared a cue from the first list (interference pairs) and half the pairs were new
(control pairs). In addition, participants predicted their ability to remember what word
was paired with a given cue from the fist list of studied words. Finally, participants took a
memory test. The results of these experiments should provide some evidence as to which
type of factor participants are using as the basis for their metamemory predictions when
both encoding and retrieval factors are present.
Because these experiments were designed to examine which type of factor is used
as the basis of metamemory predictions, there must be a discussion of the bases of
predictions. The next chapter will outline and contrast the two major schools of
metamemory bases—direct access versus the heuristic view—and will describe, in detail,
the theories of the bases of metamemory predictions. Following that discussion, there will
be a review of the current literature on the impact of encoding and retrieval factors on
metamemory predictions and accuracy.
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BASES OF METAMEMORY MONITORING
Relationship Between the Meta- and Object-Levels
On the surface, it would seem that the meta-level should always accurately reflect
what is happening at the object-level. Because the object-level is being monitored and the
monitoring process informs the meta-level, it would seem that the meta-level should be
an exact representation of the object-level. However, although metamemory generally
reflects memory, it is not completely accurate, and sometimes it is completely inaccurate.
These inaccuracies are evident at all three processes of memory.
Prior to encoding for example, if EOLs were accurately tracking memory,
participants would allocate more study time to words to which they assigned high EOLs,
indicating those words would be the most difficult to learn. Although this is sometimes
the case (e.g., Le Ny, Denhiere, & Le Taillanter, 1972; Nelson & Leonesio, 1988, Zacks,
1969), sometimes the control process of allocation of study time has not been directed to
more difficult words; rather, more study time has been allocated to easy words (Dunlosky
& Thiede, 2004; Price, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2010; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede &
Dunlosky 1999). This disconnect between the EOLs and the control process of allocation
of study time might not occur if the meta-level accurately reflected the state of words at
the object-level (but see Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003, 2005; Price et al.,
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2010; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; and Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999, for an alternate
explanation).
Another error of metamemory has been demonstrated when JOLs during encoding
are compared with DJOLs collected in the retention interval between encoding and
retrieval. JOLs have been shown to less accurately predict memory performance than
DJOLs. The primary theoretical reason is that, because JOLs are made immediately
during encoding, the factors on which JOLs are based are not the same factors as will be
evident during later retrieval. After a delay of as low of 30 seconds—the amount of time
needed to exceed the duration of one’s short-term memory (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991)—
DJOLs more accurately reflect memory outcomes, presumably because the factors during
the DJOL are more similar to those that will later influence retrieval. This finding
demonstrates that neither the JOL nor the DJOL is directly reflecting the state of the
object-level to the meta-level. Rather, they are the products of different factors that are
being monitored at each stage in the memory process. Because what is being monitored
are factors that are reflections of the object-level rather than the object-level itself, the
representation at the meta-level is distorted.
This distortion is clear in a study that showed that DJOLs responded in an
opposite way to memory outcome in terms of retroactive interference. Eakin (2005)
found that DJOLs were higher for an interference than control condition under conditions
of retroactive interference, a paradigm under which memory is worse in the interference
than the control condition. This dissociation between metamemory and memory makes it
clear that the monitoring system relies on factors other than direct access to the objectlevel to inform the meta-level.
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Clearly, despite on-going monitoring of the object-level, the meta-level is not
necessarily an accurate reflection of the object-level. Nelson and Narens (1990) stated
that the meta-level is not an exact copy of the object-level; rather, the meta-level is being
informed by a monitoring process that does not have direct access to the object-level.
The monitoring process monitors information from the object-level, which serves to
inform and change the representation at the meta-level, but this information can
sometimes be misleading or the wrong type of information, leading to inaccurate
reflections of the state of memory. Because of these monitoring errors, the meta-level is a
distortion of the object-level such that it is sometimes based on inaccurate and partial
information from the monitoring process, leading to errors. The next section discusses the
kind of information theorized to inform the monitoring process.
Bases of Metamemory
There are multiple hypotheses regarding the bases of metamemory predictions,
which fit into two broad theories, the direct access view and the heuristic view. Some
researchers have theorized that the meta-level has direct access to the object-level, via the
monitoring process. Conversely, other researchers have theorized that the object-level is
not monitored directly; rather the monitoring process monitors features of the objectlevel, which lead to inferences about the state of the object-level.
Direct Access View
The direct access view states that people have privileged access to directly
monitor their own memory and that people use this information when making
metamemory predictions. Hart (1965, 1967) was a proponent of the direct access view
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and is credited with being the first person to examine FOKs, which are predictions made
following a retrieval attempt about future memory for currently unrecalled words. Using
both general knowledge questions (Hart, 1965) and paired associates (Hart, 1967), Hart
found that participants were generally able to accurately predict their own memory
performance. He concluded that people must have privileged access to their memory
system because participants were accurate in their discrimination between what they
would and would not remember.
Lovelace (1984, Exp. 1) also provided data in support of the direct access view.
Participants studied word pairs once, twice, or four times before engaging in a final study
trial; then they predicted their future memory performance by giving JOLs for all pairs.
Not only did recall increase with more study trials, but participants accurately predicted
this increase; JOL magnitude also increased with more study trials. Like Hart, Lovelace
concluded that participants were accurate at predicting memory because they have a
privileged and direct access to their memory and accurately monitored the impact of
repeated study on memory.
Although the results of Hart’s (1965) and Lovelace’s (1984) studies seem to
support the direct access view, subsequent research has demonstrated that this view is not
supported. Many studies demonstrating dissociations between metamemory predictions
and memory performance bring the direct access view into question because it shows that
under some conditions, participants are unable to accurately predict their future memory
performance (see Eakin, 2005; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987; Schwartz & Metcalfe,
1992). Participants’ inaccuracy at predicting their memory indicates that they must not
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have privileged access to what is in memory; rather, they must base their prediction on
other information associated with what is in memory.
Heuristic View
The heuristic view suggests that people do not have direct access to the state of
memory, but they are able to provide an assessment about the state of their own memory.
The bulk of metamemory research has focused on the bases of metamemory assessments.
The predominant conclusion is that people base their assessments on other information
associated with information in memory, using this information to develop heuristics that
are generally accurate at predicting memory outcome. When the information on which
the heuristic is based influences memory and metamemory in the same way,
metamemory predictions are generally accurate, as was found by Hart (1965) and
Lovelace (1984).
For instance, in Lovelace’s (1984) study, rather than having direct access to what
is contained in memory, studying cue-target word pairs multiple times may have allowed
participants to find more ways to link the studied word pairs, resulting in having more
information about the pairs they studied four times as compared to two times as
compared to once. Then, when given the cue and making their predictions, more
information could have been accessed. Participants could have used the heuristic that
access to more information should produce better memory. Therefore, Lovelace’s results
could have been due to the fact that the heuristic used by participants—access to more
information leads to better memory—was congruent with the finding that repeated study
led to better memory, resulting in accurate metamemory predictions without relying on a
direct access explanation. Several heuristics have been proposed in the literature, and
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each will be reviewed here, including the cue familiarity heuristic (Metcalfe et al., 1993;
Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992), the accessibility
heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994), the interactive hypothesis (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001),
and the cue-utilization hypothesis (Koriat, 1997).
The cue familiarity heuristic. The cue familiarity heuristic states that
metamemory predictions are based on how familiar the cue is at the time of prediction
(Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992).
In general, cue familiarity can be increased by repetition; simply put, the more times a
person is exposed to the cue, the more familiar that information is when the prediction is
made. To test the effect of cue familiarity, Reder (1987, Exp. 6) first had participants
engage in a priming task during which they were shown one or two critical words (e.g.,
(a) gods or (b) tentacles, octopus) from some of the experimental questions that would
later be shown, and they rated how often the word(s) were encountered during listening
or reading. After the priming task, participants were presented with general knowledge
questions of varying difficulty (e.g., (a) “Where did the Greek gods live?” or (b) “How
many tentacles does an octopus have?”). Half of the participants were in the Estimate
condition; they were presented with each question and were told to estimate their ability
to answer the question by verbally stating ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (JOL) before giving their answer.
The other half of the participants were in the Answer condition in which they were
presented with each question and answered them.
Reder found that those in the Estimate condition were more likely to attempt an
answer for moderate and difficult questions if those questions were primed as compared
to unprimed, although priming did not affect accuracy. Additionally, those in the
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Estimate condition were faster in estimating their ability to answer primed questions as
compared to unprimed questions. Reder concluded that the finding that priming
influenced JOLs was consistent with the cue familiarity heuristic (Metcalfe et al., 1993;
Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) because the priming
increased familiarity.
Although Reder’s (1987) study was one of the first to suggest a link between
familiarity and metamemory predictions, other studies have since been conducted to
examine the cue familiarity heuristic. Schwartz and Metcalfe (1992, Exp. 4) had
participants engage in a priming task during which they viewed and rated a list of words
for pleasantness; some of the words were later used as cues, targets, or lures. The words
later used as cues and targets were shown in either the cue or target position of a word
pair, and the lure words were incorrect distractor words in the recognition test. For
example, participants might study FROG, TABLE, and RADIO. During encoding,
participants might study FROG - TRUCK (cue prime), MOWER - TABLE (target prime)
and CANDY - TELEVISION. During recognition, participants might be given CANDY
and four alternatives to choose from: TELEVISION (correct answer), RADIO (incorrect
lure word), COMPUTER (incorrect non-primed word), and TELEPHONE (incorrect
non-primed word).
Following the priming task, participants studied a list of cue-target pairs, some of
which consisted of the previously primed words (described above), completed a cuedrecall test, provided FOKs, and completed a recognition test. Schwartz and Metcalfe
(1992) found that participants gave higher FOKs for cue-primed words as compared to
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target-primed, lure-primed, and control words, a finding that supports the cue familiarity
heuristic.
Metcalfe et al. (1993) used a proactive interference paradigm in which
participants studied a list of cue-target words pairs (AB pairs) followed by a second list
of word pairs. Pairs on the second list consisted of re-presented pairs (AB), the same cue
re-paired with a new, related target (AB’), the same cue re-paired with a new, unrelated
target (AD), and entirely new cue-target pairs (CD). Following study of both lists,
participants completed a cued-recall test, gave FOKs, and completed a recognition test.
Metcalfe et al. found that participants gave higher predictions for the conditions in which
the cue was repeated (AB, AB’, and AD) than when the cue was not repeated (CD), a
result consistent with the cue familiarity heuristic.
Reder (1987), Schwartz and Metcalfe (1992) and Metcalfe et al. (1993) designed
experiments to specifically test the cue familiarity heuristic, and all three studies found
support for this heuristic. These researchers consistently found that participants give
higher predictions when the cue was more familiar, whether through priming of question
terms or cues or through cue repetition. This discussion of the cue familiarity heuristic is
specifically relevant to the present study, not because it will be directly manipulated, but
because—due to its influence on prediction magnitude—measures will be taken to equate
cue familiarity across experimental conditions. A heuristic that will be more directly
relevant to these experiments is the accessibility heuristic.
The accessibility heuristic. The accessibility heuristic states that metamemory
predictions are based on (a) how much information is accessible at the time of prediction,
regardless of the correctness of the information, and (b) how easily accessible that
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information is at prediction (Koriat, 1993, 1994). Koriat (1993) argued that the
magnitude of metamemory predictions is directly related to the amount of information
accessible at the time of prediction. When given the cue, if little information is accessed,
predictions will be low and vice versa. Although the correctness of the information does
not impact the magnitude of predictions differentially, it does impact the accuracy of
those predictions. As the amount of correct accessible information increases, so does
metamemory accuracy. Koriat also argued that correct information tends to be more
easily accessible than incorrect information, and also leads to better memory
performance, making this heuristic a useful one toward making accurate predictions.
Koriat (1993) examined the accessibility heuristic; following encoding of a nonword consonant string (e.g., FKDR) and distractor time, participants attempted recall of
all the letters in the string, gave FOK predictions, and completed a recognition test.
Koriat found that prediction magnitude increased as the number of letters recalled
increased, regardless of whether the recalled letters were correct, supporting the
accessibility heuristic. For letter strings on which participants recalled more letters
correctly, participants gave higher predictions and had better recognition, leading to
better metamemory accuracy. Conversely, for letter strings on which participants recalled
more incorrect letters, participants still gave higher predictions but had poorer
recognition, leading to lower metamemory accuracy. This finding supports the
accessibility heuristic because it provides evidence that both correct and incorrect
information influences prediction magnitude, but that only correct information impacts
prediction accuracy.
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Koriat (1995) further examined the accessibility heuristic using general
knowledge questions that differed in two respects: accessibility (how much information
comes to mind, as calculated by what percent of participants gave an answer to a
question) and output-bound accuracy (how likely the information is correct, as calculated
by the percent of the total answers provided to a question). Participants attempted to
answer the questions and gave FOK predictions indicating how likely they would be able
to recognize the correct answer. Participants gave higher FOKs for questions for which
they provided an answer as compared to questions they left blank, regardless of whether
the answer was correct or not, supporting the accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
When comparing FOKs for correct versus incorrect responses, FOK ratings were higher
when answers were correct than when answers were incorrect (e.g., commission errors).
This finding further suggests that correct information is more easily accessed than
incorrect information, and provides additional support for the accessibility heuristic.
Koriat (1993, 1995) found that even though the correctness of accessible
information did not influence predictions differentially, when accessed information is
correct, predictions are more accurate than when accessed information is incorrect.
Furthermore, if the majority of accessed information is incorrect, FOK accuracy is low,
and there is a dissociation between predictions and memory (e.g., Koriat, 1998). The
accessibility heuristic served as the theoretical explanation for the dissociation between
metamemory and memory reported by Eakin (2005). In addition to a typical retroactive
interference paradigm, Eakin implemented the use of the Modified Opposition Test
(MOT; Eakin, 2005; Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003; Eakin & Smith, 2012),
which was used to guide participants toward predicting about and retrieving the target
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that appeared on the original list. For example, participants might have studied SHIRT TAIL on the original list and SHIRT - TIE on the interpolated list; then, the MOT test
question SHIRT - ? included a “NOT hint” (e.g., not TIE) to cue the participants to
retrieve the target TAIL. According to the Search of Associative Memory (SAM) Theory
(Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981) whenever studied information share space in the shortterm store, their association is strengthened. On the MOT, the association between the
cue and interpolated target is strengthened because the “NOT hint” presents the
interpolated target in association with the cue. Strengthening this association leads to a
higher likelihood that the interpolated target will be retrieved instead of the original
target, thus increasing the interfering effect of having both studied the interpolated target
and by having it appear as a hint on the MOT. This interference blocks access to the
original target, exacerbating the typical interference effects found when using a standard
recall test. Eakin (2005) found that participants gave higher predictions for cues that had
two targets associated with it (interference condition) as compared to cues that only had
one target associated with it (control condition), even though memory for the interference
condition was lower than the control condition.
Eakin concluded that participants were able to retrieve more accessible
information about the interference than the control condition when making their
predictions. The conclusion that the accessibility heuristic explains Eakin’s (2005) results
is important to the current experiments because the retroactive interference paradigm was
used in these experiments. Therefore, the influence of accessibility is expected to be
evident in the findings here.
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The cue familiarity (Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992;
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) and accessibility heuristics (Koriat, 1993, 1994) are both
hypotheses that provide explanations regarding the bases of metamemory predictions.
Although historically they were examined separately, recently the interactive hypothesis
has proposed that the people do not base predictions on the two independently, but rather
both work serially as a basis of metamemory predictions (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001).
The interactive hypothesis. The interactive hypothesis suggests that cue
familiarity and accessibility are different mechanisms that are both involved in making
metamemory predictions (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001). Koriat and Levy-Sadot theorized
that the cue familiarity mechanism is rapid and must occur first. If familiarity is high,
participants will initiate a memory search, allowing the accessibility mechanism to occur,
leading to the retrieval or generation of accessible information. The amount of
information accessed further influences predictions; a high prediction is given if a lot of
information is retrieved, or a low prediction is given if little information is retrieved.
Conversely, if the rapid familiarity prediction is low, search will be quickly terminated or
will not occur at all, meaning that the accessibility mechanism will not occur, resulting in
participants relying on familiarity alone to make a prediction. Relying solely on
familiarity and the lack of retrieving accessible information also influences predictions
such that a low prediction is given.
To examine the interactive hypothesis, Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) manipulated
both the potential amounts of accessible information and the familiarity of answers to
questions. Participants were given a series of questions divided into four groups: high
accessibility/high familiarity, high accessibility/low familiarity, low accessibility/high
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familiarity, and low accessibility/low familiarity. Participants attempted to answer each
question and gave FOKs for all questions. Both cue familiarity and accessibility strongly
affected predictions such that predictions were significantly higher for high familiarity
questions as compared to low familiarity questions and higher for high accessibility
questions than low accessibility questions. The interactive hypothesis would predict that
when familiarity is low, memory search would terminate quickly or not occur at all.
Consistent with this prediction, when familiarity was low, the effects of accessibility
were also low as compared to when familiarity was high. Also, familiarity affected both
low and high accessibility questions, suggesting that familiarity was not limited to the
rapid, pre-retrieval predictions, as Reder and colleagues argued (see Nhouyvanisvong &
Reder, 1988; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992). Instead, participants gave the highest
predictions for questions high in both familiarity and accessibility, indicating that when
both mechanisms are at play, predictions are affected to a greater degree than when the
mechanisms are separated.
Although the interactive hypothesis (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001) states that the
cue familiarity and accessibility heuristics work serially to make metamemory
predictions, another hypothesis, the cue-utilization hypothesis, has been examined. The
cue-utilization hypothesis (Koriat, 1997) also integrates the previous hypotheses, but
extends them to include other potential influences on metamemory predictions.
The cue-utilization hypothesis. The cue-utilization hypothesis proposes that
people rely on three classes of cues when assessing memory: intrinsic, extrinsic, and
mnemonic (Koriat, 1997). Intrinsic cues are associated with word characteristics, such as
the degree of relatedness between cues and targets, perceived learning difficulty, or how
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well an image can be formed. Conversely, extrinsic cues are those associated with the
experimental session, such as the learning conditions or the encoding strategies
individuals use. Extrinsic cues can include repetition, massed versus distributed practice,
or level of processing (Koriat, 1997). Mnemonic cues are internal cues that may serve as
an alert that learning has occurred and signal to a person the likelihood that the
information will be recalled in the future. According to Koriat (1997), mnemonic cues
include cue familiarity (Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992;
Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992), accessibility to information (Koriat, 1993, 1994), ease of
accessing information (Koriat, 1993), ease of processing (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick,
& Sanvito, 1989), and knowledge about the results of past recall attempts (King et al.,
1980; Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993).
According to the cue-utilization hypothesis, intrinsic and extrinsic cues directly
affect metamemory because participants apply a specific rule when making predictions.
With respect to intrinsic cues, an individual may infer that related words (e.g., FROG TOAD) will be recalled better than unrelated words (e.g., CANOE - ONION) and will
adjust his predictions accordingly. Similarly, with extrinsic cues, a person may infer that
pairs studied twice will be recalled better than pairs studied once and will give higher
predictions for those pairs. Koriat (1997) further argued that intrinsic and extrinsic cues
also indirectly impact metamemory predictions through their influence on mnemonic
cues because mnemonic cues are sensitive to intrinsic and extrinsic cues. For example,
related words might result in higher predictions than unrelated words because of the
sense of familiarity produced when processing related words. Similarly, the pairs studied
twice allow more opportunity to find ways to link the two words, producing more
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accessible information than pairs studied once and resulting in higher predictions for
repeated pairs than pairs studied once.
Although intrinsic and extrinsic cues directly impact metamemory predictions,
Koriat (1997) posited that the degree to which they impact predictions might be different
depending on manipulations and conditions. For example, the influence of extrinsic
factors is evident when the degree of learning is manipulated within subjects but not
when manipulated between subjects (see Begg et al., 1989 and Carroll & Nelson, 1993
for a review). Specifically, when the manipulation is implemented within subjects,
participants may be more aware of the impact of the manipulation, which allows them to
use the extrinsic cue appropriately. This example provides some evidence that under
certain conditions, the impact of extrinsic cues is discounted relative to the impact of
intrinsic cues, a pattern that the cue-utilization hypothesis allows.
To test the cue-utilization hypothesis, Koriat (1997, Exp. 3) manipulated both an
intrinsic and an extrinsic cue. Prior to the study, independent judges rated the degree of
associative relatedness of word pairs and estimated how many people out of 100 would
be likely to recall the target if given the cue. These pairs were then divided into three sets
of 24 pairs: 12 easy (most memorable; e.g., FROG - TOAD and 12 difficult (less
memorable; e.g., ONION - CANOE) pairs. Associative relatedness was the intrinsic cue
manipulation. Participants studied the three sets of word pairs such that one set was
studied once, one set was studied twice, and one set was studied three times. The number
of times a set was studied was the extrinsic cue manipulation. For each pair, participants
immediately provided a JOL after studying the pair. After all pairs were studied and
judged, participants completed a cued recall test.
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With respect to the extrinsic cue, Koriat found that both recall and metamemory
predictions increased as the number of study trials increased, but that the number of study
presentations had a stronger influence on recall than on predictions. Specifically, recall
increased steadily as the number of presentations increased, but prediction magnitude
increased less sharply with each increase in study presentation. With regard to the
intrinsic cue, Koriat found that perceived difficulty had similar effects on both recall and
predictions such that recall was better and predictions were higher for easy pairs than
hard pairs. These findings support the cue-utilization hypothesis because both the
intrinsic and extrinsic cue exerted an influence on predictions, but to differing degrees.
The intrinsic cue had an equivalent impact on recall and predictions, whereas the
influence of the extrinsic cue was discounted during the predictions. Regardless of the
fact that both the intrinsic and extrinsic cue were manipulated within-subjects, Koriat
concluded that participants are more sensitive to the differences associated with the
intrinsic cue (associative relatedness manipulated based on difficulty) than with the
extrinsic cue (repetition). Koriat further concluded that manipulating repetition within
subjects could have masked participants’ sensitivity to the differences among items.

28

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON ENCODING VERSUS RETRIEVAL FACTORS
Encoding Factors
As described previously, Nelson and Narens’ (1990) metamemory framework
stated that metamemory is measured during each of the three memory processes:
encoding, retention, and retrieval. In this section, the impact that factors manipulated at
encoding has on metamemory predictions is discussed; in the next section, the impact that
factors manipulated at retrieval has on metamemory predictions will be discussed.
Most of the research examining metamemory has examined how factors
manipulated at encoding that affect the encoding process influence metamemory
predictions. Some of these factors include overlearning (Carroll & Nelson, 1993; Nelson
et al., 1982), levels of processing (Lupker et al., 1991), repetition (Hertzog et al., 2010;
Lupker et al., 1991), and attention (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007; Sacher et al., 2009). To
foretell, for all of the studies discussed in this section, the pattern of metamemory
predictions tracks that of memory performance, indicating that, at least for these
manipulations, participants base their predictions on the same factors that will influence
memory, resulting in accurate predictions.
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Overlearning
Nelson et al. (1982) and Carroll and Nelson (1993) examined the impact of
overlearning on FOKs. Participants studied number-word pairs (e.g., 48 - Dollar; Nelson
et al., 1982) or unrelated cue-target word pairs (e.g., ENGINE - DISEASE; Carroll &
Nelson, 1993) until they correctly recalled each pair to a specified learning criterion. In
Nelson et al.’s (1982) study, the learning criterion was manipulated as being able to
correctly recall the target, given the cue, once, twice, or four times; the twice- and fourtimes-recalled conditions were both overlearning manipulations. In Carroll & Nelson’s
(1993) study, the learning criterion was manipulated as one or six correct recalls
(overlearning condition). After a pair was learned to its set criterion, it was dropped from
the list and no longer studied. Once all pairs were learned to their set criterion,
participants left, but returned four weeks later and completed a final recall phase, an FOK
phase, and a recognition phase. Nelson et al. (1982) and Carroll and Nelson (1993) found
that memory performance was better and metamemory predictions were higher for the
overlearned pairs as compared to the pairs learned once, showing that memory and
metamemory followed the same pattern. When forced to study the pairs multiple times,
more information could have been generated to link the two words. At prediction, pairs
tested multiple times produced information that could come to mind to serve as the basis
of their FOKs leading to higher FOKs than for pairs learned once. Because this
information also provided additional links connecting the test cue to the target, at recall
the same information increased recall, leading to more accurate predictions in the
overlearning conditions.
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Levels of Processing
Lupker et al. (1991, Exp. 1) examined the impact of processing level on FOKs.
Some participants counted the number of vowels in an unrelated word pair (shallow
processing) and others generated a sentence using both the cue and target (deep
processing). After all unrelated pairs (e.g., LOBSTER - SHORTS) were studied,
participants completed a cued-recall test, an FOK phase, and a cued-stem completion task
(e.g., LOBSTER - SHO___). Participants in the sentence generation condition performed
better on both the cued-recall and cued-stem completion memory tests, and also gave
higher FOK predictions than participants in the vowel counting condition. Participants
who engaged in deep semantic processing focused on the meaning of the word pairs and
generated more information associating those pairs together than participants who
engaged in shallow processing. At prediction, more of this information was accessible on
which to base metamemory predictions, resulting in higher FOKs for deep processing
pairs than for shallow processing pairs. Because this same information also aided recall,
FOKs were more accurate in the deep processing (sentence generation) condition than the
shallow processing (vowel counting) condition.
Repetition
In addition to studying how level of processing impacts metamemory predictions,
Lupker et al. (1991, Exp. 2) also examined how the length of study time affected FOK
predictions through the use of a repetition manipulation. Participants studied a list of
unrelated word pairs for either 2 s or 7 s, and as each pair appeared, participants said the
word pair aloud at the rate of one time per second, resulting in 2 or 7 repetitions of each
word pair. Following study, participants completed the cued-recall, FOK, and cued-stem
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completion phases. Participants who repeated pairs for 7 s had better memory and gave
higher predictions than participants who repeated pairs for 2 s, again showing that
metamemory tracked memory.
In another study examining the effects of repetition on FOK predictions,
participants in Hertzog et al.’s (2010) experiment studied a list of unrelated word pairs
either once, twice, or four times. Participants returned following a one-week delay to
complete the cued-recall, FOK, and recognition phases. Like before, Hertzog et al. found
that as repetition increased, so did memory performance and FOK predictions.
As the number of study presentations increased, more information could have
been generated to link the cue and target words together. Then, at prediction, cues that
were repeated were produced more information that could come to mind and serve as a
basis for their predictions, resulting in higher FOKs for the pairs studied four times as
compared to twice as compared to once. Because repetition led to information linking the
test cue to its target, recall also increased with repetition, leading to more accurate
predictions for the pairs studied four times as compared to twice as compared to once.
Attention
Barnes and Dougherty (2007) examined the impact of full versus divided
attention on global DJOL predictions by having participants complete four studyjudgment-recall cycles. During the study phase, participants studied category-exemplar
word pairs (e.g., ANIMAL - HORSE, FRUIT - APPLE). Their attention to this initial
task was divided; they also listened to words through headphones with the instruction to
indicate when they heard ‘man-made objects’ (e.g., BICYCLE) while ignoring any words
that were not considered ‘man-made objects’ (e.g., OCEAN). Following study,
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participants predicted how many of the 40 studied pairs would be remembered at test and
how many exemplars from each of the four studied categories would be remembered, for
a total of five different predictions. Finally, participants engaged in a free recall test.
Participants in the divided attention condition consistently performed worse on the recall
test and also gave lower predictions across the four cycles than participants in the full
attention condition.
Sacher et al. (2009) also examined the effect of full versus divided attention
(manipulated within subjects) on item-by-item FOK predictions. When engaging in the
full attention condition, participants were instructed to study weakly related cue-target
word pairs (e.g., CUSTOMS - FRAUD) with the understanding that they would later be
tested on those pairs. When engaging in the divided attention condition, participants were
instructed to study the word pairs while simultaneously press a button when they heard an
even number being spoken through headphones. Following study, all participants
completed the cued-recall, FOK, and recognition phases. Sacher et al. found that
participants had better memory and gave higher predictions for pairs studied under full
attention as compared to divided attention.
The results of these studies indicate that when attention is not divided, attention
can be allocated toward generating information to link the two words together. At
prediction, for pairs studied under full attention, more information would be available to
come to mind than for pairs studied under divided attention, leading to higher predictions
for pairs studied under full than divided attention. Because more information linking the
cue and target is generated for pairs studied under full attention than divided attention,
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recall was also higher for pairs studied under full attention, resulting in more accurate
predictions for these pairs as compared to pairs studied under divided attention.
In all the studies presented in this section, memory and metamemory showed
similar patterns of results, indicating some consistency in how people respond to
manipulations affecting the encoding process. Typically, this result is obtained because
the encoding manipulation produces the kind of information which influences predictions
and recall in the same way. This is not to say participants have direct access to this
knowledge; rather, the kind of information generated by the encoding manipulation,
when it serves as the basis for predictions, is diagnostic of the effect of that manipulation
on memory. Therefore, metamemory and memory are influenced in the same way by the
results of the manipulation, producing an association between the two. In the current
experiments, metamemory at encoding will be examined by dividing attention during the
encoding process. The impact of dividing attention at encoding on metamemory and
memory will be examined when factors at retrieval are also manipulated.
Although considerable research has explored how manipulations affecting the
encoding process influences metamemory predictions, less research has examined how
factors at retrieval impact metamemory predictions. The next section will consider this
limited research.
Retrieval Factors
One area that has been substantially underexplored in the metamemory field is
how manipulations at retrieval influence metamemory predictions. Some of the
manipulations that have been investigated include retrieval practice (Carroll & Nelson,
1993; King et al., 1980; Nelson et al., 1982), set size (Eakin & Hertzog, 2012b;
34

Schreiber, 1998; Schreiber & Nelson, 1998), and interference (Eakin, 2005; Leibert &
Nelson, 1998; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011; Wahlheim, 2011). As will
be discussed, sometimes metamemory is impacted in the same way as memory; however,
in some cases metamemory and memory are not associated. This change in the pattern of
results between memory and metamemory indicate that when a factor that affects the
retrieval process is manipulated, participants may be using information at prediction that
is not diagnostic of memory in the same way the basis of metamemory predictions on
factors manipulated at encoding was diagnostic of memory.
Retrieval Practice
King et al. (1980) investigated the effect of retrieval practice on DJOL
predictions. One group of participants engaged in five consecutive study trials, followed
by a prediction phase and a test phase (e.g., SSSSS-P-T). Another group had six
consecutive study trials followed by a test phase (e.g., SSSSS-S-T). A third group
engaged in three alternating study-test trials, followed by a prediction phase and a final
test phase (e.g., STSTST-P-T). The last group completed three alternating study-test
trials, followed by another study phase and a final test phase (e.g., STSTST-S-T).
Participants in the retrieval practice condition (STSTST-P-T condition) had better
memory and gave higher predictions than participants who only had multiple study trials
(SSSSS-P-T condition). In this study, memory and metamemory showed similar patterns
of results; both were higher for conditions in which participants engaged in retrieval
practice.
Similar to King et al. (1980), the studies on overlearning (Carroll & Nelson, 1993;
Nelson et al., 1982) had repeated test trials, although this was not an explicit
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manipulation in these experiments. Because participants were required to learn pairs to a
set criterion, many pairs, especially those that were overlearned, were presented and
tested multiple times before being dropped from study. Because overlearned pairs were
remembered better and given higher predictions than pairs that were not overlearned, it is
possible the results were due to the repeated retrieval practice of the overlearned pairs as
compared to the pairs that were not overlearned.
Memory and metamemory were associated in both King et al. (1980) and Carroll
& Nelson (1983). The reason for this association could be that, when forced to retrieve
pairs multiple times, more information could have been generated to link the cue and
target words. At prediction, pairs retrieved multiple times resulted in information coming
to mind that could serve as the basis of participants’ metamemory predictions, resulting
in higher predictions for these pairs as compared to pairs retrieved once. At recall, this
information also provided cues to link the test cue to its target, resulting in increased
recall and leading to more accurate predictions for the pairs retrieved multiple times than
pairs retrieved once.
Set Size
Schreiber and Nelson (1998), Schreiber (1998), and Eakin and Hertzog (2012b)
manipulated cue and/or target set size to examine the impact of small versus large set size
on metamemory predictions. Set size refers to the number of words that are associated
with a stimulus word (Nelson, Schreiber, & McEvoy, 1992). When a target word is
studied in isolation—under extralist cueing—and memory for the target is later prompted
by a related cue, the typical finding is that memory is better when the cues and/or targets
have a small, rather than a large, set size (Nelson et al., 1992). According to the
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Processing of Implicit and Explicit Representations 2 (PIER 2) model (Nelson,
McKinney, Gee, & Janczura, 1998), set size effects are due to competition between the
target word and other associations of the cue or target for retrieval. These implicit
interference effects are implicit because people cannot explicitly identify a small- versus
a large-set-size word. That is, set size effects obtained under extralist cueing due to
implicit interference are eliminated under intralist cueing (the cue and target are studied
together). PIER 2 proposes that studying the two words together constrains the set (e.g.,
the number of words that are associated with a given word) to words that are only
associated with both the cue and the target; this set is always smaller than the set of the
cue or target alone. Therefore, competition at retrieval is reduced because of the smaller
set size and implicit interference is eliminated (Nelson et al., 1998).
To examine metamemory for set size effects in memory, participants first studied
either target words alone in an extralist cueing procedure (e.g., RIVER; Eakin & Hertzog,
2012b; Schreiber & Nelson, 1998) or intact related cue-target word pairs (e.g., BROOK RIVER; Eakin & Hertzog, 2012b) in an intralist cueing procedure. After study,
participants made DJOL predictions, given the cue, about memory for their associated
targets. Then the cue was re-presented, and participants recalled the target. In the FOK
condition, participants completed the cued-recall test and then gave FOK predictions. For
both the DJOL and FOK conditions, extralist cueing led to set-size effects—participants
had better memory for words with a small- than a large-set-size—which were eliminated
under intralist cueing. Metamemory predictions tracked the set-size effects under extralist
cueing and the elimination of set-size effects under intralist cueing; predictions were
higher for small- than large-set-size words under extralist cueing and equal under intralist
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cueing (also see Eakin & Hertzog, 2012a, 2012b; Schreiber, 1998). In every case,
metamemory tracked the impact of set size on memory.
The finding that metamemory tracks implicit interference effects is interesting
because it demonstrates that a factor does not need to be available to conscious awareness
to influence metamemory. In addition, this finding is in direct opposition to studies
examining the impact of explicit interference on metamemory.
Interference
Several different types of explicit interference paradigms have been used to
examine its impact on metamemory, including proactive interference (Metcalfe et al.,
1993; Wahlheim, 2011), interference from related competitors (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011),
and retroactive interference (Eakin, 2005; Leibert & Nelson, 1998).
Proactive interference. Metcalfe et al. (1993, Exp. 1) examined the impact of
proactive interference on metamemory. Proactive interference occurs when previously
learned information interferes with memory for subsequently learned information.
Participants first studied a list of cue-target word pairs (e.g., FROG - TOAD; AB pairs);
then, participants studied a second list of cue-target word pairs. Pairs on the second list
consisted of re-presented pairs (e.g., FROG - TOAD; AB), the same cue re-paired with a
new and related target (FROG - LEG; AB’), the same pair re-paired with a new but
unrelated target (FROG - TABLE; AD), and completely new pairs (e.g., KNIFE SCISSORS; CD).
Metcalfe et al. found moderate proactive interference effects in memory when the
cue was re-paired with a different target, and robust proactive interference effects when
the cue was not repeated. However, metamemory predictions were highest when the cue
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was repeated, regardless of which target was paired with that cue. Memory and
metamemory were dissociated because the pattern of memory results differed from the
pattern of metamemory predictions. Metcalfe et al. proposed the cue familiarity heuristic
(Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992),
which suggests that metamemory predictions are influenced by familiarity with the cue;
that is, when the cues are repeated, familiarity is high, leading to high predictions. The
dissociation with memory occurs because familiarity due to repetition of the cues does
not lead to better memory.
Wahlheim (2011) also examined proactive interference by having participants
study two lists of related cue-target word pairs (AB) in which some pairs on the second
list included cues from the first list re-paired with a different target (AD; interference);
other pairs on the second list did not include any previously presented cues or targets
(CD; control). Participants were instructed to remember the target from the second list.
Some participants gave JOLs for each pair immediately following study of each pair,
followed by a cued-recall test of the second list; other participants gave DJOLs for all
pairs in a separate phase, and then completed the cued-recall test of the second list. In
both conditions, participants had better memory in the control than interference
condition. Conversely, they gave higher predictions in the interference condition as
compared to the control condition; metamemory and memory were dissociated.
Wahlheim’s results support the accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994)
because when two targets are linked to a single cue in the interference condition, more
information could come to mind, given the cue, in the interference than the control
condition. Basing metamemory predictions on the amount of information that comes to
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mind, given the cue, results in higher predictions for the interference than control
condition. Ironically, this same information will produce interference effects in memory;
therefore, basing predictions on accessibility to more information was not diagnostic of
future memory. This conclusion suggests that—contrary to the results discussed with
respect to encoding factors—the accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994) is not always
diagnostic of memory. This conclusion is supported by Wahlheim’s study, as well as by
the next explicit interference studies discussed.
Related competitors. Rhodes and Tauber (2011) examined the impact of
semantically related competitors on both immediate and delayed JOLs. Participants
studied unrelated word pairs (e.g., TABLE - CHEER), divided into two types, deceptive
and control. For the deceptive pairs, the cue word (e.g., TABLE) had a semantically
related competitor that shared similar letters with the studied target (e.g., CHAIR vs.
CHEER); competitors were chosen to produce interference during retrieval. For the
control pairs, there was no related competitor. Participants studied four blocks of pairs;
immediate JOLs were collected for half of the pairs within each block and DJOLs were
collected for the other half of the pairs. For JOLs, participants were shown the cue and a
partial target (e.g., TABLE - CH_ _ R) and told to attempt to recall the target (pre-JOL
recall) and then provide their JOL rating. For DJOLs, following study of Blocks 1 and 2,
in separate phases, participants engaged in pre-JOL recall and provided DJOLs. The same
procedure was followed after Block 4 for pairs studied in Blocks 3 and 4. Participants had
better memory in the control than the interference condition but gave higher predictions
in the interference condition as compared to the control condition, producing a
dissociation between memory and metamemory. Rhodes and Tauber attributed their
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findings to the accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993; 1994). Rhodes and Tauber argued
that the interference pairs resulted in more information coming to mind when making
predictions, resulting in high predictions, but that the information led to interference,
resulting in inaccurate predictions.
Retroactive interference. Leibert and Nelson (1998) examined how retroactive
interference impacts metamemory predictions. Retroactive interference occurs when
newly learned information interferes with memory for previously learned information.
Participants studied two lists of unrelated cue-target word pairs. On the second list either
the same cue-target pairs were repeated (e.g., LOCK - FEVER, LOCK - FEVER; ABAB), the cues were repeated but paired with a different target (e.g., PENNY - TEA,
PENNY - LUNG; AB-AD), the target was repeated but paired with different cues (e.g.,
BASKET - EAR, CARDBOARD - EAR; AB-CB), or entirely new pairs (e.g., SLEEP ADVERB, TILE - PERFUME; AB-CD) were studied (Leibert & Nelson, 1998).
Following study, DJOLs were collected (DJOLs were called POKs in this study), and
memory was tested through a cued-recall test. Leibert and Nelson found that recall was
worst when the cues were repeated (AB-AD), best when the pairs were repeated (ABAB), and in between for the control condition (AB-CD) and when the targets were
repeated (AB-CB). However, metamemory predictions only increased for the repeated
intact pairs (AB-AB); predictions were similar for all other conditions. These findings
again showed a dissociation between memory and metamemory. Although Leibert and
Nelson (1998) entertained the idea that the cue familiarity heuristic (Metcalfe et al., 1993;
Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) could be playing a role
in their results, they ultimately concluded that their findings are most consistent with the
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accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994). They argued that the repeated pairs resulted
in more information coming to mind to serve as a basis for metamemory predictions as
compared to the other conditions, which is why predictions were significantly higher for
this condition.
Leibert and Nelson (1998) focused on comparing cue repetition to target
repetition within a retroactive interference paradigm, by using unrelated word pairs.
Although they discount the role that cue familiarity could have played in their study, it is
possible that cue familiarity could influence DJOLs in an interference paradigm because
the cue is repeated in the interference condition. Eakin (2005) examined metamemory
under retroactive interference but included manipulations designed to test whether
metamemory predictions are based on cue familiarity (Metcalfe et al., 1993; Reder, 1987;
Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) or accessibility (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
Eakin used the typical retroactive interference paradigm, but participants studied a list of
related word pairs under either extralist or intralist cueing. Participants under intralist
cueing studied related cue-target pairs (e.g., STEP - STOOL) on the first list, and either
the cues re-paired with a second target (e.g., STEP - LADDER) in the interference
condition, or a new pair (e.g., FROG - TOAD) in the control condition. Participants
under extralist cueing studied the targets in isolation. Both cueing procedures produced
retroactive interference effects in memory. A comparison of metamemory sensitivity
between the intralist and extralist cueing procedures allowed for a measure of the
influence cue familiarity on predictions. Because cues were only repeated under intralist
cueing—and repeated three times in the interference condition under intralist cueing—if
predictions were influenced by cue familiarity, they should have been higher under
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intralist than extralist cueing, and highest in the intralist interference condition. These
findings were not obtained. Regardless of cueing procedure, predictions were always
higher in the interference condition than in the control condition, providing support for
the accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994). For both cueing procedures, two targets
were associated with each cue in the interference condition, providing more information
to come to mind to be used as a basis for prediction than for the control condition.
In the studies manipulating factors at retrieval, the basis of metamemory
predictions was frequently the amount of accessible information at the time of prediction,
and metamemory and memory were frequently found to be dissociated (Eakin, 2005;
Leibert & Nelson, 1998; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011; Wahlheim,
2011).
Conversely, in the studies manipulating factors at encoding, metamemory
predictions were also based on accessibility, but metamemory and memory were always
found to be associated (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007; Carroll & Nelson, 1993; Hertzog et
al., 2010; Lupker et al., 1991; Nelson et al., 1982; Sacher et al., 2009).
The following experiments take advantage of these disparate findings to examine
whether people use factors manipulating encoding or factors manipulating retrieval in the
same study as their basis for metamemory predictions. As discussed, Attention (e.g., full
versus divided attention) was the factor manipulated at encoding. Although also
implemented during encoding, Retroactive Interference served as the factor at retrieval
because the effects of interference occur at the retrieval process. Retroactive Interference
was crossed with Attention to examine which factor served as the basis of metamemory
predictions when both factors were available in the same experiment. An association
43

between memory and metamemory was predicted if metamemory predictions were based
on encoding factors, whereas a dissociation was predicted if metamemory predictions
were based on retrieval factors. That these predicted findings are disparate allows an
examination of the differential influence of encoding versus retrieval factors.
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SPECIFIC AIMS
Two experiments were conducted to examine whether metamemory predictions
were based on encoding or retrieval factors independently or whether they were
influenced by both at the same time. Specific aims and predictions are detailed below.
Aim 1
Aim 1: Examine whether metamemory predictions are influenced by factors at encoding,
at retrieval, or both when factors at encoding and retrieval are manipulated in the
same paradigm.
As the review of the literature suggested, the majority of studies examining
metamemory either examine encoding factors or retrieval factors separately, never both
together. Although examining each in isolation allowed for an independent examination
of factors at encoding and retrieval independently, while also controlling for other
potential influences on metamemory, it is possible that factors both at encoding and
retrieval influence memory and metamemory. However, the degree to which this
supposition is true has not been tested empirically. It could be the case that people are not
able to consider both factors simultaneously and focus only on encoding or only on
retrieval factors. The goal of Experiment 1 was to serve Aim 1 by examining the
differential influence of encoding versus retrieval factors on metamemory when the
factors co-occur in the same paradigm. A factor at encoding that has been shown to
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influence both memory and metamemory—Attention—and a factor at retrieval that has
also been shown to influence both memory and metamemory—Retroactive
Interference—were manipulated in Experiment 1.
The key benefit of selecting Attention and Retroactive Interference as the
manipulated factors is that there is they each have distinct impacts on metamemory when
each factor is manipulated alone. Specifically, metamemory was found to be associated
with memory under divided attention (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007; Sacher et al., 2009),
whereas metamemory was found to be dissociated from memory under retroactive
interference (Eakin, 2005; Nelson & Leibert, 1998). These disparate patterns of findings
were capitalized upon in Experiment 1 to observe which factor influenced metamemory
when both were manipulated. If memory and metamemory were associated under divided
attention but not dissociated under retroactive interference, the conclusion would have
been that people were ignoring the factor at retrieval and basing their metamemory
predictions solely on the encoding factor. Conversely, if memory and metamemory were
dissociated under retroactive interference, but not associated under divided attention, the
conclusion would have been that people were ignoring the factor at encoding and basing
their metamemory predictions solely on the retrieval factor. If people were able to use
both factors to inform their metamemory predictions, an interaction would have been
obtained such that predictions were associated under divided attention, but dissociated
under retroactive interference.
The manipulations proposed for Experiment 1 generated several predictions,
based on the hypothesis that metamemory predictions would be sensitive to both
encoding and retrieval factors:
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Hypothesis 1: Typical memory effects were predicted to be obtained. Memory
was predicted to be better under full than divided attention and better in the control than
interference condition in the retroactive interference paradigm. Additionally, no
interaction was predicted; that is, the difference in memory performance between the
control and interference conditions within each Attention condition would not be
different from one another. Specifically, because both Attention and Retroactive
Interference have been shown to produce a memory decrement, it was expected that
memory would be worse in the interference than control condition under both Attention
conditions. Further, under divided attention, overall memory was predicted to be worse
for both the control and interference conditions, as compared to full attention.
Hypothesis 2: DJOLs were predicted to be lower under divided attention as
compared to full attention; memory and metamemory were predicted to be associated.
Hypothesis 3: DJOLs were expected to be higher in the interference condition as
compared to the control condition; memory and metamemory were expected to be
dissociated under retroactive interference.
Hypothesis 4: No interaction between Attention and Retroactive Interference was
predicted. Overall, DJOLs were predicted to be higher for the full than divided attention
conditions, but within each attention condition, predictions were predicted to be higher
for the interference than control condition.
Hypothesis 5: DJOLs were predicted to be accurate overall and equally accurate
for the full and divided attention conditions because it was predicted that DJOLs would
not rely on factors at encoding (e.g., Attention). However, because of the dissociation
between memory and metamemory predicted for the retroactive interference conditions,
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DJOLs were predicted to be more accurate for the control condition as compared to the
interference condition. No interaction was predicted.
Aim 2
Aim 2: Examine whether the type of metamemory prediction is critical to observing the
shared impact of manipulations at encoding and retrieval on metamemory.
One reason DJOLs were predicted to vary with both encoding and retrieval
factors is because they are made during the retention interval between the encoding and
retrieval processes; as such, it was possible that they could have been influenced by both
the encoding and the retrieval factors. However, the findings from Experiment 1 showed
that DJOLs were only influenced by the retrieval factor. Because DJOLs were collected
during the retention period following encoding—and after a delay—they might have been
more influenced by the retrieval than the encoding factor. In fact, it has been argued that
DJOLs are predictions at retrieval (Schwartz, 1994) and therefore primarily influenced by
retrieval factors. Experiment 2 was designed to serve Aim 2 by comparing the impact of
encoding and retrieval factors on JOLs, metamemory predictions collected immediately
during the encoding phase, to DJOLs that were collected during the retention interval.
JOLs are predictions elicited during the encoding process on an item-by-item basis. After
each cue-target word pair is studied, the cue is immediately represented, and participants
make predictions about future memory for the target they just studied. Because these
predictions are made during the encoding phase of the memory process, Nelson and
Narens (1990) suggested that people are monitoring information contained in short-term
memory and basing their predictions on that information, whereas DJOLs are made after
a delay under conditions more comparable to future retrieval conditions. As such, the
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typical finding is that DJOLs are more accurate than JOLs (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992;
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). In addition, DJOLs, but not JOLs, have been shown to be
sensitive to implicit interference effects, which are explained by factors occurring at
retrieval and not at encoding (Eakin & Hertzog, 2012b).
Showing that JOLs are sensitive to the attention manipulation at encoding, but not
the retroactive interference manipulation at retrieval, would provide evidence that
metamemory predictions are differentially based on one factor or the other, but not both,
and that which factor influences predictions depended on what type of prediction was
being collected. The manipulations for Experiment 2 produced several hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Typical memory effects were predicted to be obtained for both the
DJOL and JOL conditions. Memory was predicted to be better for full than divided
attention and better for the control than interference condition; no interaction was
predicted. Experiment 2 was expected to replicate Experiment 1 in regard to the memory
findings, regardless of type of metamemory prediction.
Hypothesis 2: The findings for DJOL sensitivity were expected to replicate
Experiment 1. Based on those findings, DJOLs were not predicted to vary between the
full and divided attention conditions; they were predicted to be higher for the interference
than control condition resulting in dissociation between memory and metamemory for the
DJOLs.
Hypothesis 3: The critical comparison of interest was JOL magnitude under full
versus divided attention. Because JOLs are predictions made during the encoding phase,
it was predicted that JOLs would be higher for the full than divided attention condition;
memory and metamemory were predicted to be associated. However, it was possible for
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JOLs to be influenced by both the encoding and retrieval factors. If this was the case,
JOLs were predicted to be dissociated under retroactive interference with higher JOLs for
the interference than control condition within each of the Attention conditions. No
interaction was predicted.
Hypothesis 4: Replicating Experiment 1, DJOLs were expected to be equally
accurate for the full and divided attention conditions. However, because of the
dissociation between memory and metamemory predicted for the retroactive interference
conditions, DJOLs were expected to be more accurate for the control condition as
compared to the interference condition.
Hypothesis 5: JOLs were predicted to be equally accurate for both the full
attention and divided attention conditions, because both probability of recall and
sensitivity were predicted to be higher for the full than divided attention condition. JOL
accuracy was not predicted to vary between the control and interference conditions.
However, if the unanticipated outcome of JOLs being influenced by both encoding and
retrieval factors was obtained, it was hypothesized that JOLs would be more accurate for
the control than interference condition within both Attention conditions.
Aim 3
Aim 3: Examine whether encoding-based predictions, JOLs, were sensitive to the
encoding factor if salience to the retrieval factor was decreased by using the
standard recall test rather than the MOT.
It was predicted that the JOLs would be sensitive to the attention manipulation,
rather than to retroactive interference. However, using the MOT provides a strong
manipulation of retroactive interference that could mask the influence of the encoding
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factor on JOLs. Therefore, Aim 3 was examined in Experiment 2 by adding a condition
for which a standard cued recall test was used as the final memory test. The standard
cued recall test presents the cue word (e.g., SHIRT -

) for both prediction and recall.

The “NOT hint” (e.g., not TIE) used on the MOT was not part of the standard test at
prediction or at recall. Several additional hypotheses about the conditions using the
standard cued recall test were:
Hypothesis 1: Typical memory effects were predicted to be obtained on the
standard test, comparable to those obtained on the MOT. Memory was predicted to be
better for full than divided attention and better for the control than interference condition.
No interaction was predicted.
Hypothesis 2: The critical comparison was for JOL sensitivity between the MOT
and the standard cued recall test. Because JOLs were not shown to be sensitive to the
Attention manipulation using the MOT, when the standard test was used, JOLs under full
attention were predicted to be higher than under divided attention for the standard test
condition. Because the hint thought to elicit strong retroactive interference was
eliminated on the standard test, it was hypothesized that the Attention manipulation
would no longer be overshadowed by the Retroactive Interference manipulation, resulting
in the best chance to observe the effect of Attention on JOLs.
Hypothesis 3: JOLs were predicted to be equally accurate for both the full
attention and divided attention conditions. JOL accuracy was expected not to vary
between the control and interference conditions.
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PILOT STUDIES
The purpose of Experiments 1 and 2 was to examine the effects of a factor
manipulated at encoding—Attention—and a factor manipulated at retrieval—Retroactive
Interference—on metamemory within the same paradigm. Before implementing the two
manipulations in the same paradigm, the materials were examined separately to ensure
that the typical retroactive interference and attention effects were found. Two pilot
studies were conducted to examine the effect of retroactive interference (Pilot 1) and
attention (Pilot 2) on memory and metamemory, separately.
Pilot 1
This pilot experiment examined the effect of retroactive interference on
probability of recall, DJOL magnitude, and DJOL accuracy. Probability of recall was
calculated by dividing the number of correctly recalled targets by the total number of
targets tested. It was hypothesized that the typical retroactive interference effect would be
obtained such that memory would be better in the control than the interference condition,
but that predictions would be higher for the interference than the control condition.
Specifically, it was expected that there would be a dissociation between memory and
metamemory predictions in terms of retroactive interference, replicating Eakin (2005).
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Method
Participants and design. Participants were 80 undergraduate students at
Mississippi State University recruited through the Psychology Research Program. All
participants completed the study in exchange for one point required for a psychology
course. One participant was excluded from the analysis because of low probability of
recall in the control condition (less than 20% recall for those targets, or fewer than 3 out
of 15), resulting in a total of 79 participants included in the analyses. This study used the
retroactive interference paradigm to examine memory and metamemory for the control
condition (e.g., only one target paired with a cue) versus the interference condition (e.g.,
two targets paired with a cue).
Materials. Two lists of 45 related cue-target word pairs were developed using the
University of South Florida word association norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber,
1998) to serve as the original and interpolated lists, shown in Appendix A. Lists were
counterbalanced across participants. The original list was the first list participants studied
and the interpolated list was the second list participants studied; Table 1 shows the
retroactive interference paradigm and includes an example of word pairs that might be on
each of these lists. The original encoding control and interference conditions and the
interpolated encoding interference condition were counterbalanced such that every word
pair served in each of those three conditions, whereas the interpolated encoding control
condition was static across all counterbalanced conditions.
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Table 1
Retroactive Interference Paradigm
Retroactive
Interference
Control

Original Encoding
Study Phase
WIND - AIR

Interference SHIRT - TAIL

Interpolated Encoding
Study Phase
CANDY - BAR
SHIRT - TIE

DJOL
(0-100)
WIND (not COOL)
SHIRT (not TIE)

Recall
Phase
WIND (not COOL)
SHIRT (not TIE)

All cues and targets were unrelated to any other cues or targets presented on either
list aside from the word with which it was paired, as tested by ListChecker Pro 1.2
(Eakin, 2010). In addition, words on the original and interpolated lists were not related to
each other. Words were equated on several associative characteristics, including forward
and backward strength, the number of mediators and shared associates, and in terms of
other word-level characteristics known to influence memory, including set size, printed
word frequency, concreteness, and cue connectivity. Forward strength refers to the
associative relationship between a cue and its target, whereas backward strength refers to
whether the target is also a member of its cue’s set (Eakin, 2010). Mediators are words
that are associated with both a cue and a target, but the cue and target are not typically
associated with each other (e.g., CHILD is a mediator between MOTHER and BOY;
Eakin, 2010). Shared associates are words that serve to link the cue and target, but they
might not be directly related to either the cue or target (Eakin, 2010). Controlling for
these characteristics ensured that the word lists used in these experiments were as equal
as possible so that any findings in these experiments were not due to item or list effects.
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Procedure. Participants were treated according to ethical guidelines and provided
written informed consent before beginning the experiment. Participants were placed into
a testing station equipped with a computer, chair, and white noise machine to block
extraneous sound.
Participants first engaged in a practice phase in which they studied six practice
pairs to familiarize themselves with the encoding procedure. Following the practice
phase, participants studied the original list of 30 related cue-target word pairs at the rate
of 6 s each. Participants were instructed to try to form a mental image of the cue and
target interacting in some way. These instructions ensured that participants were
attempting to engage in deep processing of the word pairs. When participants formed a
mental image, they pressed the “Y” key, indicating they had formed an image. After the
6 s elapsed, the word pair disappeared, and participants indicated whether their image
was vivid or not vivid by pressing “V” or “N” on the keyboard. The vividness rating was
used as another method of ensuring deep processing of the word pairs. After all pairs in
the original encoding list were studied and images rated, participants studied the
interpolated list under the same instructions. Half of the pairs on the interpolated list were
new word pairs that had not been studied before (control condition) and half of the pairs
used cues from the original list and re-paired them with a new related target (interference
condition).
After participants studied all the pairs on the interpolated list, they completed a
DJOL phase which included the MOT (Eakin, 2005; Eakin et al., 2003; Eakin & Smith,
2012). The MOT was used to guide participants toward predicting about and retrieving
the target from the original list. For example, if SHIRT - TAIL was studied on the
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original list followed by SHIRT - TIE on the interpolated list, the MOT test question
SHIRT - ? included the hint (not TIE) to direct participants to the original list target. This
test had the additional benefit of setting up the strongest manipulation of retroactive
interference because the presence of the hint at test increases the interfering effect of the
target used in the hint (Eakin, 2005; Eakin et al., 2003; Eakin & Smith, 2012).
During the DJOL phase, participants were presented with a cue and a “NOT hint”
(e.g., SHIRT [not TIE]) and gave a prediction from 0 = definitely not able to recall to 100
= definitely able to recall denoting their predicted likelihood of recalling the target they
studied from the original list. Following the DJOL phase, participants completed the
cued-recall test in which they were shown a cue and associated MOT “NOT hint” again
and typed in the target word they recalled that was paired with the cue during the original
study phase. Participants were then debriefed and thanked.
Results
Unless otherwise noted, all statistical significance levels were set at  < .05.
Probability of recall. Probability of recall was predicted to be higher in the
control condition than the interference condition, a prediction supported by a pairedsamples t-test. Probability of recall was significantly better for the control (M = .62, SE =
.02) than the interference (M = .53, SE = .02) condition, t(78) = 4.96, p < .001.
DJOL sensitivity. DJOLs were given for all words. However, because it is
possible to spontaneously retrieve the target when the DJOL was elicited, combining
recalled and unrecalled word pairs can obscure the influence of retroactive interference
on the DJOLs, because the DJOL magnitude could be inflated due to the presence of
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DJOLs for correctly recalled targets in the analysis. In order to determine DJOL
sensitivity in the absence of retrieved targets, DJOL magnitude was analyzed for
unrecalled word pairs only as well as for all word pairs. Examining unrecalled word pairs
only mimics the analysis used for the FOK paradigm (Hart, 1965, 1967) for which FOKs
were collected for unrecalled targets only and the analysis used by Eakin (2005).
A paired-samples t-test was conducted on DJOL predictions for all word pairs,
both recalled and unrecalled. Predictions were not significantly different between the
control (M = 68.22, SE = 2.12) and the interference (M = 66.75, SE = 2.06) conditions,
t(78) = 0.90, p = .37. However, as hypothesized, a paired-samples t-test on unrecalled
pairs showed that DJOLs were higher for the interference (M = 51.30, SE = 2.95) than the
control (M = 44.18, SE = 3.12) condition, t(78) = -2.41, p = .02.
DJOL accuracy. To test DJOL accuracy, gamma correlations were computed
separately for the control and interference conditions for each participant and then
aggregated; both mean gammas were significantly greater than zero. A paired-samples ttest indicated that DJOL accuracy was significantly higher for the control (M = .69, SE =
.04) than the interference (M = .48, SE = .06) condition, t(71) = 3.85, p < .001.
Discussion
The materials and manipulations used in this pilot experiment resulted in the
predicted dissociation between memory and metamemory that is generally found in
studies manipulating retroactive interference (e.g., Eakin, 2005). Specifically, probability
of recall was better for the control versus interference condition, but DJOL predictions
were higher for the interference versus control condition. These results supported the
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decision to use the control and interference conditions of the retroactive interference
paradigm as the retrieval factor in Experiments 1 and 2.
Pilot 2
The second pilot experiment examined the effect of full versus divided attention
during the encoding phase on probability of recall, DJOL predictions, and DJOL
accuracy. It was hypothesized that memory would be better in the full than divided
attention condition and that DJOLs would track memory such that memory will be better
and predictions will be higher under full attention as compared to divided attention.
Therefore, an association was predicted between memory and metamemory in Pilot 2,
replicating Barnes and Dougherty (2007).
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 65 undergraduate students at
Mississippi State University recruited through the Psychology Research Program.
Fourteen participants were excluded from the analyses for failing to engage in the divided
attention task, resulting in a total of 51 participants in the analyses. All participants
completed the study in exchange for one point required for a psychology course. The
study was a single factor within-subjects design comparing memory and metamemory for
pairs studied under full versus divided attention.
Materials. The same word pairs from the original list as well as the control word
pairs from the interpolated word list from List 1 and List 2 from the Pilot 1 were used in
this Pilot 2, creating two lists of 45 word pairs. In addition, an auditory discrimination
task (described below) was designed to serve as the divided attention task. The
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interference word pairs from the interpolated list were not included to avoid introducing
interference into this paradigm.
Procedure. Participants were treated according to ethical guidelines and provided
informed consent before beginning the experiment. Participants were placed into a testing
station equipped with a computer, chair, a set of headphones, and a white noise machine
to block extraneous sound. Participants engaged in two separate Study-DJOL-Recall
trials; a full attention trial and a divided attention trial. Trial order was counterbalanced
across participants. Each phase within each trial began with a practice session consisting
of six practice word pairs that were used to allow participants to familiarize themselves
with the procedure before moving on to the experimental stage of each phase.
Full attention trial. During the full attention trial, participants studied a list of 45
related cue-target word pairs for 6 s each and were instructed to form an interactive
image, as described in Pilot 1. They also assessed that mental image as vivid (“V”) or not
vivid (“N”) to ensure that participants were engaging in deep processing of the word
pairs. After all pairs were studied, participants completed the DJOL phase during which
they were presented with a cue (e.g., SHIRT) and gave a prediction from 0 = definitely
not able to recall to 100 = definitely able to recall about how likely they would be able to
recall the target that was paired with that cue on a later cued-recall test. After all cues
were presented and DJOLs given, participants completed the cued-recall phase. In this
phase, participants were again shown each cue and typed in the target that was paired
with that cue during encoding. Participants were debriefed and thanked.
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Divided attention trial. The procedure for the divided attention trial was the same
as for the full attention trial except that, while studying the word pairs, participants also
engaged in an auditory tone discrimination task. This task consisted of participants
listening to two alternating sound sequences and pressing the left mouse button when the
sequence changed from one to the other. Participants were instructed about the divided
attention task and practiced the task separately before it was implemented during the
encoding phase. Then, participants studied the second list of 45 related cue-target word
pairs with the same mental imagery instructions while also pressing the left mouse button
when the tone sequences changed, and they rated their images as vivid or not vivid, as
described previously. Following study, participants completed the DJOL and cued-recall
phases as outlined in the full attention trial before being debriefed and thanked.
Results
Unless otherwise stated, statistical significance was set at  < .05.
Probability of recall. Probability of recall was predicted to be better under full
attention than divided attention. A paired-samples t-test supported this hypothesis;
probability of recall was significantly better under full (M = .69, SE = .02) than divided
(M = .56, SE = .03) attention, t(50) = 7.24, p < .005.
DJOL sensitivity. DJOLs were predicted to be higher under full attention than
divided attention. First, a paired-samples t-tests was conducted on DJOL magnitude for
all word pairs, both recalled and unrecalled. DJOLs were significantly higher under full
(M = 76.70, SE = 1.69) than divided (M = 65.94, SE = 2.31) attention, t(50) = 5.80, p <
.001. Similarly, when comparing DJOL magnitude for only unrecalled words, DJOLs
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were significantly higher under full (M = 46.05, SE = 3.08) than divided (M = 38.56, SE
= 3.22) attention, t(50) = 2.98, p = .004.
DJOL accuracy. To test DJOL accuracy, gamma correlations were computed
separately for full attention and divided attention for each participant, and then
aggregated. Both mean gamma correlations were significantly greater than zero. A
paired-samples t-test showed that DJOL accuracy was equal for the full (M = .77, SE =
.04) and the divided attention (M = .77, SE = .03) conditions, t(50) = 0.07, p = .94. This
result was expected because metamemory tracked memory in that probability of recall
was better and DJOL magnitude was higher for the full as compared to the divided
attention condition. Therefore, participants were equally accurate in predicting their
memory performance because they gave lower predictions for the word pairs studied
under divided attention.
Discussion
This pilot experiment showed that the word lists and manipulations used resulted
in the same pattern of memory findings as prior research on dividing attention. Under
conditions of divided attention, a memory decrement was obtained (Craik, Govoni,
Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000; Mulligan &
Hartman, 1996; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & Dori, 1998; Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, &
Sorek, 2007). Furthermore, metamemory predictions tracked memory performance such
that predictions were lower in the divided attention condition than the full attention
condition. These findings supported the decision to use Attention as the encoding factor
in Experiments 1 and 2.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was conducted to test the hypotheses stated under Aim 1. The goal
was to examine the degree to which DJOLs were based on factors at encoding, such as
Attention, versus factors at retrieval, such as Retroactive Interference. The first pilot
study showed that memory and metamemory were dissociated under conditions of
Retroactive Interference, such that memory was better in the control than the interference
condition, but metamemory predictions were higher for the interference than the control
condition. The second pilot study produced an association between memory and
metamemory in terms of Attention such that both memory and metamemory predictions
were lower under divided than full attention. Experiment 1 manipulated both Attention
and Retroactive Interference in the same paradigm to determine whether metamemory
predictions were based on factors at encoding or at retrieval.
Memory was predicted to be better under full than divided attention, and better for
the control than the interference condition. However, Attention and Retroactive
Interference were not expected to interact because the degree to which memory is
affected for the interference condition as compared to the control condition were
expected to be equal within each of the Attention conditions.
With respect to metamemory predictions for the Attention factor, DJOLs were
predicted to be lower under divided attention than full attention, indicating that
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metamemory tracked memory. Conversely, for the Retroactive Interference factor,
DJOLs were expected to be higher for the interference condition as compared to the
control condition, indicating that memory and metamemory were dissociated under this
factor. Again, no interaction between the Attention and Retroactive Interference factors
was predicted with respect to DJOL sensitivity. Within each attention condition, it was
expected that predictions would be higher for the interference than control condition.
Finally, metamemory predictions were predicted to be equally accurate for the full
and divided attention conditions because metamemory was predicted to not rely on the
encoding factor. Conversely, because memory and metamemory were predicted to be
dissociated under conditions of retroactive interference, more accurate predictions for the
control as compared to the interference conditions were predicted.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 209 undergraduate students at Mississippi State University
recruited through the Psychology Research Program. A total of seven participants were
excluded based on either (a) failure to actively engage in the divided attention task or (b)
failure to correctly recall at least 20% of the control targets under full attention (or fewer
than 3 of 15 targets). Of the remaining 202 participants, 86 were assigned to the divided
attention condition and 116 were assigned to the full attention condition. All participants
who completed the study earned one credit toward a requirement for a psychology
course.
This study was a 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference:
control, interference) mixed factorial design with Attention manipulated between subjects
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and Retroactive Interference manipulated within subjects. Contrary to Pilot 2, Attention
was manipulated between subjects in this experiment because it was shown in a third
(unreported) pilot that having participants complete two Retroactive Interference
paradigms in which Attention was manipulated within subjects resulted in fatigue effects.
The dependent variables were probability of recall, DJOL sensitivity, and DJOL
accuracy.
Materials
Two lists of 45 related cue-target word pairs were created using the University of
South Florida word association norms (Nelson et al., 1998) to serve as the original and
interpolated lists, as shown in Appendix A. Two lists were created so that any results
could not be attributed to the word list, and these lists were counterbalanced across
participants. The procedure for Experiment 1 is shown in Table 2 below. The original
encoding phase (both control and interference conditions) and the interpolated encoding
interference condition were counterbalanced such that each word pair served in each of
these three conditions. The interpolated encoding control condition did not change.
Table 2
Experiment 1 Procedure
Retroactive
Interference
Control
Interference

Original Encoding
Study Phase

Interpolated Encoding
Study Phase

DJOL
(0-100)

Recall
Phase

WIND - AIR

CANDY - BAR

WIND (not COOL)

WIND (not COOL)

SHIRT - TAIL

SHIRT - TIE

SHIRT SHIRT (not TAIL)
(not TAIL)
Note. The auditory discrimination task (e.g., the divided attention task) was implemented
during the Original Encoding Study Phase only.
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Aside from the word with which it was paired, all cues and targets were unrelated
to any other cues or targets presented on either list, as tested by ListChecker Pro 1.2
(Eakin, 2010). All words were equated on other associative characteristics: forward and
backward strength, number of mediators and shared associates, cue and target set size,
word frequency, and word concreteness. Controlling for these word-level characteristics
ensured that the word lists used in this experiment were as equal to one another as
possible, decreasing the likelihood of any item-level effects.
The Attention factor was manipulated by using an auditory discrimination tone
task. This task consisted of two tone sequences, with participants pressing the mouse
button when they heard the sequence change from one to another. This task was
implemented during the original encoding phase only to avoid confound between the
Attention manipulation and the Retroactive Interference manipulation which occurred
during the interpolated encoding phase.
Procedure
Participants were treated according to ethical guidelines and provided written
informed consent before beginning the experiment. They were seated in a testing station
equipped with a computer, chair, and white noise machine. They were randomly assigned
to one of the two attention conditions. For those in the full attention condition, the
headphones were moved out of reach from the participant. For those in the divided
attention condition, participants were instructed that they would be using headphones at
the beginning of the experiment.
Full attention trial. Participants in the full attention condition first engaged in a
practice phase in which they studied six practice word pairs for 6 s each to familiarize
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themselves with the procedure. Following the practice phase, they completed the original
encoding phase during which they studied 30 cue-target word pairs also at the rate of 6 s
each. Participants were instructed to attempt to form a mental image of the cue and target
interacting in some way to ensure deep processing of the word pairs. Once the mental
image was formed, participants pressed the “Y” key to indicate they had formed an
image. Again, these instructions were used to ensure deep processing of the word pairs.
After the 6 s study time elapsed, the word pair disappeared, and participants rated their
formed mental image as vivid (“V”) or not vivid (“N”). After all word pairs were studied
in the original encoding phase, participants studied the interpolated encoding list under
the same instructions. The difference between the original and interpolated encoding
phases was that half of the pairs on the interpolated list were new pairs that had never
been studied (control condition), and half of the pairs utilized the same cue paired with a
new, unstudied target (interference condition).
After participants studied all word pairs on the interpolated list, they completed
the DJOL phase which included the MOT (Eakin, 2005; Eakin et al., 2003; Eakin &
Smith, 2012), in which they were shown a cue accompanied by a “NOT hint” (e.g.,
SHIRT [not TIE]). Participants gave a prediction from 0 = definitely not able to recall to
100 = definitely able to recall. This prediction was their assessment of the likelihood that
they would be able to recall the target paired with a cue that was studied on the original
encoding list. The MOT was used to ensure that participants were directed to retrieve the
target from the original, rather than the interpolated, list. Additionally, the MOT resulted
in the strongest manipulation of Retroactive Interference because it presents the
interfering information during the prediction and recall phases. According to the Search
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of Associative Memory (SAM) Theory (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), studied
information is held in a long-term store based on associative relationships between or
among the studied information. For example, when participants studied SHIRT - TAIL,
the two words become associated in long-term store, as is the interpolated word pair,
SHIRT - TIE. According to SAM, whenever these two words share space in the shortterm store, their association is strengthened. On the MOT, because the “NOT hint”
presents the interpolated target in association with the cue, the prior association between
the cue and the interpolated target established during study is strengthened. The result of
the strengthened association is an increased likelihood of retrieving that target, rather
than the original target. Therefore, the interfering effect of having studied the interpolated
target is increased by also reading it as the hint on the MOT during the DJOL. When the
cue is presented on the MOT at test, the interpolated target is repeatedly retrieved (further
strengthening that association), blocking access to the original target. Therefore, the
MOT exacerbates the typical interference effects obtained using a standard recall test
because the MOT itself strengthens the association between the competing interpolated
target and the cue, reducing the likelihood of retrieving the desired, original target. This
effect is further exacerbated when also using the MOT during the DJOL.
Following the DJOL phase, participants completed the MOT cued-recall test on
which they were given the cue and “NOT hint” again and typed in the target word they
recalled that was paired with that cue during the original study phase. Participants had
unlimited time to try to recall the correct target, and they were instructed to do their best
and to strive for accuracy. They were also instructed that if they were not able to
remember the correct target, then they should guess or type “NEXT” to continue. After
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responding to all 30 cues, participants were debriefed and thanked. See Table 2 for a
review of this procedure.
Divided attention trial. Participants in the divided attention condition followed
the same procedure as those in the full attention condition, with the addition of the
auditory tone discrimination task. Prior to engaging in the practice phase for the original
encoding phase, participants were given detailed instructions about the divided attention
task and practiced that task alone. The practice phase for the auditory tone task was as
follows: (a) participants first heard two sequences of tones separately; (b) then, they
heard both sequences played back to back with no break; (c) then, they practiced the full
task of clicking the mouse button when the tone sequence changed from one to the other.
After the auditory discrimination task was practiced, participants studied the word pairs
on the original encoding list. In addition to studying the pairs, participants also clicked
the mouse button each time the tone sequence changed from one to the other. As
mentioned above, the divided attention task was implemented during the original
encoding list only, because memory was later tested for these cue-target pairs. Using the
divided attention task only during the original encoding list allowed for the manipulation
of the Retroactive Interference factor without confounding it with divided attention,
which could have occurred if the divided attention task was implemented during study of
the interpolated list. All other procedures were the same as those in the full attention
condition.
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Results
Unless otherwise stated, statistical significance was set at  < .05. Repeatedmeasures analysis of variance tests (ANOVAs) were conducted for each of the dependent
variables—probability of recall, DJOL sensitivity, and DJOL accuracy. The independentsamples t-test conducted to ensure that there was no effect of the word lists on probability
of recall was not significant, t(207) = 0.22, p = .82. Therefore, List was collapsed for all
subsequent analyses.
Probability of Recall
Probability of recall was calculated by dividing the number of correctly recalled
targets by the total number of tested targets. To test Hypothesis 1 under Aim 1 that
memory would be better for full than divided attention and better for the control than the
interference condition, a 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference:
control, interference) ANOVA was conducted on probability of recall. The means for the
experimental conditions are reported in Table 3.
Table 3
Experimental Condition Means for Recall
RI Condition

Full Attention

Divided Attention

Control
.61 (.02)
.48 (.02)
Interference
.56 (.02)
.42 (.02)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.
Supporting Hypothesis 1, probability of recall was significantly higher under full
(M = .58, SE = .02) than divided (M = .45, SE = .02) attention, F(1, 207) = 25.77 p <
.001, ηp2 = .11. In addition, a significant retroactive interference effect was obtained;
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probability of recall was significantly higher for the control (M = .55, SE = .01) than the
interference (M = .49, SE = .02) condition, F(1, 207) = 18.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .08. Also as
predicted, the interaction between Attention and Retroactive Interference was not
significant, p > .05. Figure 2 shows the significant memory effects that support
Hypothesis 1.

Figure 2.

Experiment 1 probability of recall.

Discussion. The typical retroactive interference effect was obtained in recall. The
magnitude of the retroactive interference effect was similar for full and divided attention.
DJOL Sensitivity
A 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on DJOL magnitude. The means for the
experimental conditions are reported in Table 4. Hypothesis 2 under Aim 1 stated that
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predictions would be higher in the full than divided attention condition. However, DJOLs
under full (M = 50.14, SE = 2.17) and divided attention (M = 47.80, SE = 2.39) were not
significantly different from one another, F(1, 202) = 0.53, p = .47, ηp2 = .003.
Table 4
Experimental Condition Means for DJOL Magnitude
RI Condition

Full Attention

Divided Attention

Control
45.62 (2.33)
41.88 (2.57)
Interference
54.67 (2.55)
53.71 (2.81)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.
Hypothesis 3 under Aim 1 stated that predictions would be higher in the
interference as compared to the control condition. Supporting Hypothesis 3 and shown in
Figure 3, DJOLs were significantly higher in the interference (M = 54.19, SE = 1.90) than
in the control (M = 43.75, SE = 1.73) condition, F(1, 202) = 38.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .16,
replicating Eakin (2005).
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Figure 3.

Experiment 1 DJOL magnitude.

As Hypothesis 4 under Aim 1 predicted, Attention and Retroactive Interference
did not interact, F(1, 202) = 0.69, p = .41, mainly because DJOLs were higher in the
control than interference condition under both full and divided attention. DJOLs were not
higher for the full than divided attention conditions, as had been predicted by both
hypotheses.
Discussion. DJOLs did not track the effect of Attention on probability of recall,
producing a dissociation between metamemory and memory. This finding indicates that
participants did not base their DJOLs on the encoding factor. Memory and metamemory
were dissociated: memory was better for the control than interference condition, but
metamemory predictions were higher for the interference than control condition. This
finding suggested that participants based their metamemory predictions on factors that
occurred at retrieval, although these predictions were not impacted in the same way as
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memory. As Eakin (2005) hypothesized, participants based their predictions on the
amount of information accessible, given the cue, supporting the accessibility hypothesis
(Koriat, 1993, 1994). In the case of a retroactive interference paradigm, when two targets
were associated with the cue—as was the case in the interference condition—more
information could come to mind resulting in higher predictions than in the control
condition for which only one target was associated with the cue. Therefore, although the
DJOL magnitude did not track memory, they were dissociated in the predicted direction
based on Eakin (2005) and Pilot 1. DJOLs did not vary with Attention, and the same
pattern was obtained for Retroactive Interference for both levels of Attention.
DJOL Accuracy
To test the hypothesis that DJOLs would be accurate, overall, Goodman-Kruskal
Gamma correlations were calculated for each participant between recall accuracy and
their DJOLs. The overall mean gamma correlation was .56 (SE = .05), which was
significantly greater than zero, t(203) = 12.41, p < .001.
To test Hypothesis 5 under Aim 1 that DJOLs would be equally accurate for the
full and divided attention conditions, and more accurate for the control than the
interference condition, a 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference:
control, interference) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the mean gamma
correlations; the means for each experimental condition are reported in Table 5.
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Table 5
Experimental Condition Means for DJOL Accuracy
RI Condition

Full Attention

Divided Attention

Control
.72 (.03)
.65 (.04)
Interference
.59 (.06)
.43 (.07)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.
DJOLs were more accurate under the full (M = .66, SE = .04) than divided (M =
.54, SE = .04) attention; however, the difference did not quite achieve significance, F(1,
187) = 4.03, p = .05, ηp2 = .02. Because a dissociation was obtained under the Attention
manipulation, mean accuracy was not equivalent between full and divided attention as
expected (although the difference was not significant). Hypothesis 5 about metamemory
accuracy under Retroactive Interference was supported; DJOL accuracy was significantly
higher for the control (M = .69, SE = .02) than the interference (M = .51, SE = .05)
condition, F(1, 187) = 13.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. As predicted, the interaction was not
significant, p > .05. Figure 4 shows the significant difference in DJOL accuracy between
the control and interference conditions.
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Figure 4.

Experiment 1 DJOL accuracy.

Discussion
As predicted, memory was better under full than divided attention and better for
the control than interference condition. Attention did not interact with Retroactive
Interference; the magnitude of the significant retroactive interference effect was similar
for the two Attention conditions. Probability of recall was significantly better for the
control than interference condition under both full and divided attention.
With respect to metamemory sensitivity, DJOL magnitude was similar under both
full and divided attention; participants did not base their predictions on the encoding
factor. Instead of the predicted association between memory and metamemory, memory
and metamemory were dissociated under the Attention manipulation. DJOL magnitude
was higher in the interference than in the control condition, producing a dissociation
between memory and metamemory under Retroactive Interference. This dissociation was
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predicted based on prior research also showing that the pattern of DJOL magnitude for
the control and interference conditions of the retroactive interference paradigm is
opposite to the pattern for recall (e.g., Eakin, 2005; Leibert & Nelson, 1998); this
dissociation between memory and metamemory provides a replication of Eakin (2005). It
also provides additional evidence for the accessibility heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994). The
accessibility heuristic states that metamemory predictions are based on the amount of
information that comes to mind when making a prediction. Because the cue in the
interference condition was paired with two targets theoretically, more information was
potentially accessible than in the control condition for which only one target was paired
with the cue. Apparently DJOLs were based on accessibility, producing a dissociation
because these multiple targets that led to higher DJOLs actually produced the interference
effects in memory. In terms of the goals of the present experiment—combined with the
lack of difference in DJOL magnitude between full and divided attention—obtaining the
predicted dissociation demonstrated that DJOLs were based on the retrieval factor and
not on the encoding factor.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that when both an encoding factor and a retrieval
factor were manipulated in the same paradigm, although memory was impacted by both
factors, metamemory was impacted only by the retrieval factor. This finding is surprising
and not what was predicted. The manipulation of the Attention factor was not subtle. The
divided attention task was obtrusive and annoyed many participants, yet they did not
adjust their DJOLs downward to predict its negative impact on memory. The Retroactive
Interference manipulation was subtler by comparison; control and interference pairs were
randomly presented in a different order on the original and interpolated list. Participants
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could have completely missed that some cues were repeated and repaired with second
targets on the interpolated list. However, DJOLs seemed to be exclusively based on this
factor.
The finding that DJOLs were completely based on the retrieval factor suggests
that focusing on this factor overpowered the effects of divided attention on metamemory
that had previously been obtained in Pilot 1 and in the prior literature (e.g., Barnes &
Dougherty, 2007; Sacher et al., 2009) in which Attention alone was manipulated. Barnes
and Dougherty (2007) collected five DJOL predictions: a global DJOL and a DJOL for
each of the four categories of studied words; they did not collect item-by-item DJOLs as
Experiment 1 did. Barnes and Dougherty found that predictions were significantly lower
under divided as compared to full attention for global DJOLs. Sacher et al. (2009)
collected item-by-item FOKs (on a 6-point scale) following the recall phase of targets
from cue-target word pairs. Similar to Barnes and Dougherty (2007), Sacher et al. (2009)
found that FOK predictions were significantly lower under divided than full attention.
These two studies, along with Pilot 2, showed that participants can modulate their DJOLs
to reflect memory effects under full versus divided attention. However, Experiment 1 did
not replicate those findings.
The key difference between Experiment 1 and prior experiments is that attention
was not manipulated in isolation. Experiment 1 implemented two manipulations,
Attention at encoding and Retroactive Interference at retrieval. The complete lack of
effect of the attention manipulation on DJOLs, despite a detrimental effect of attention on
memory, suggests that the effect of the retrieval factor on metamemory overshadowed
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that of the encoding factor. Metamemory was completely based on retroactive
interference, rather than on attention.
One reason metamemory could have been impacted only by the retrieval factor
could be because of the type of metamemory prediction used in Experiment 1. DJOLs
were selected because of their seemingly optimal positioning in the retention interval
between encoding and retrieval, offering the best chance of being impacted by both
factors. In fact, it would have been reasonable to predict that DJOLs would be more
influenced by the encoding than the retrieval factor because it occurred prior to the
retrieval phase during which the effects of interference would be evidenced. Conversely,
there is literature suggesting that DJOLs are primarily influenced by retrieval factors.
Schwartz (1994) argued that DJOLs were predictions at retrieval, meaning that because
DJOLs are made after a delay following encoding, they are based on information
retrieved from long-term memory rather than on factors present during encoding.
Perhaps a more equitable test of whether metamemory is impacted by factors at
encoding when factors at retrieval are also manipulated would be to collect a
metamemory prediction during the encoding phase. JOLs are predictions made during the
encoding phase on an item-by-item basis. After each cue-target word pair is studied,
immediately following the offset of each pair, a JOL for future recall of the target word is
collected. Because JOLs were collected before the retrieval factor could presumably
effect the predictions, collecting JOLs allow for the best opportunity for factors at
encoding to influence metamemory.
Furthermore, there is evidence that JOLs and DJOLs are not based on the same
information in memory. The delayed-JOL effect, coined by Nelson & Dunlosky (1991),
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is the finding that DJOLs are significantly more accurate than JOLs. Nelson and
Dunlosky (1991) posited that DJOLs are more accurate than JOLs because JOLs are
collected immediately after encoding; therefore, JOLs are based on information in shortterm memory. Not only does other information in short-term memory add noise to the
prediction, but also the conditions and context are less likely to match those at retrieval
resulting in inaccurate predictions. Implementing a delay longer than the duration of
short-term memory between encoding and prediction eliminates these impediments to
accurate predictions as evidenced by more accurate DJOL than JOL predictions.
Additionally, Eakin and Hertzog (2012) showed that JOLs and DJOLs are not
influenced by the same factors. When manipulating set size—defined as the number of
words associated with a given word—to examine implicit interference on metamemory
predictions, Eakin and Hertzog found set size effects for DJOLs, but not for JOLs. Set
size effects refer to the finding that both probability of recall and prediction magnitude is
lower for large- than small-set-size words. Set size effects occur at retrieval and are due
to the increased competition from words in the sampling set; a large set produces more
competition than a small set. DJOLs were sensitive to the effect on memory; DJOLs were
lower for the large- than small-set-size words. However, JOLs did not differ between
large- and small-set-size words. This finding showed that JOLs were insensitive to
implicit interference—demonstrating that JOLs were not based on this retrieval factor—
at least when only a retrieval factor was manipulated.
For these reasons, in Experiment 2, JOLs were compared to DJOLs to allow for a
better test of the impact of the encoding factor, rather than the retrieval factor on
metamemory even when both were manipulated. If JOLs were found to be influenced by
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the retrieval rather than the encoding factor, it would provide strong evidence that
metamemory predictions are more influenced by factors at retrieval than at encoding
when both factors are implemented in the same study, regardless of when they are
collected. This possibility was tested in Experiment 2.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to further examine the impact of factors at encoding
and at retrieval on metamemory predictions. The findings from Experiment 1 indicated
that predictions were based only on factors at retrieval, although metamemory was
dissociated from memory. DJOLs were collected during the interval after encoding and
before retrieval with the goal of using a metamemory measure that could be influenced
equally by encoding and retrieval factors. However, because they were collected in a
separate phase from encoding, they might have been more likely to have been influenced
by the retrieval than the encoding factors. In Experiment 2, an additional measure of
metamemory was included as a comparison to DJOLs. JOLs were also collected because
they are predictions made during the encoding phase. Specifically, immediately after
each cue-target word pair was studied, before moving to the next word pair, the cue was
re-presented and a prediction was made about future memory of the target with which it
was just studied. Adding the JOL to the paradigm served two purposes. First, it served as
the best opportunity to observe the influence of encoding factors on metamemory,
because JOLs are assessed during the encoding phase. Second, if JOLs were not
influenced by encoding factors, and were influenced by retrieval factors, this finding
would provide strong evidence that metamemory predictions were only based on retrieval
factors when both were manipulated in the same experiment. Experiment 2 manipulated
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what type of predictions were collected in order to further investigate whether predictions
during the encoding process were influenced by factors at encoding, retrieval, or both.
For JOLs, a participant studied SHIRT - TAIL and immediately following the offset of
that pair, SHIRT was presented for a prediction about future recall of TAIL on a later
memory test. This study-then-predict procedure repeated for every word pair on the list.
JOLs were contrasted with DJOLs for which the entire list of word pairs were studied and
then, in a separate phase, each cue was presented for prediction about future memory for
the target on a later memory test (see Table 6).
Because JOLs are predictions at encoding, they should be more likely to be
influenced by encoding factors—specifically attention manipulations—because JOLs are
collected while the encoding manipulation is applied. For the JOL procedure in
Experiment 2, the full versus divided attention manipulation was applied during the
original encoding phase during which the JOL is collected. The auditory discrimination
task was only implemented during the original encoding phase so as to not confound this
manipulation with the Retroactive Interference manipulation that occurred during the
interpolated encoding phase (see Table 6 for full procedure). If the divided attention task
was implemented during both encoding phases, it would not be possible to determine
whether the results were due to the Attention or Retroactive Interference manipulations.
If metamemory predictions can be based on both encoding and retrieval, collecting
metamemory predictions during the encoding phase, as is the case for JOLs, provided the
best opportunity to observe the encoding effects on metamemory, when retrieval effects
were also manipulated.

82

SHIRT - TAIL

Interference

SHIRT - TIE

CANDY - BAR

Interpolated
Encoding
Study Phase

SHIRT - TAIL

WIND - AIR

Original
Encoding Study
Phase 2

SHIRT - TIE

CANDY - BAR

Interpolated
Encoding
Study Phase 2

WIND (not COOL)
SHIRT (not TIE)

SHIRT (not TIE)

Recall Phase

WIND (not COOL)

DJOL Phase
(0-100)

Note. The auditory discrimination task was implemented during both instances of the Original Encoding Study Phase.

WIND - AIR

Original
Encoding
Study Phase

Control

RI Condition

DJOL Procedure Implementing the MOT during the DJOL and Recall Phases

Table 6
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Because the main aim was to understand whether metamemory predictions were
based on factors at encoding or retrieval or both when both were manipulated in the same
paradigm, the retrieval factor also had to be manipulated for the JOLs. If JOLs were
collected in the typical retroactive interference paradigm, the word pairs on the original
encoding list would not have the chance to be influenced by the retrieval factor as
interference does not occur during study of the original encoding list. Therefore, an
additional study phase was implemented in Experiment 2 such that the original and
interpolated encoding phases of the retroactive interference paradigm were presented as
is typically conducted. Original-list word pairs were studied, such as SHIRT - TAIL,
sometimes including the divided attention manipulation, followed by study of
interpolated-list word pairs, such as SHIRT - TIE. Using this procedure, participants
could experience the retroactive interference manipulation prior to making their JOL.
Then, the JOL phases followed: the original list was studied again, again sometimes
including the divided attention manipulation and JOLs were collected. The interpolated
list was then studied again and JOLs were also collected. Table 9 shows the entire
procedure for the JOL condition. For completion, the addition of the second repetition of
the study phases was also implemented for the DJOL condition; however, DJOLs were
collected in their own phase following the second set of encoding phases for the original
and interpolated lists. Table 6 shows the full procedure for the DJOL condition.
Although there was the possibility for retrieval factors to influence JOLs, this
outcome was not predicted. It was predicted that JOLs would be insensitive to retroactive
interference; JOL sensitivity was not predicted to vary between the control and
interference conditions. Conversely, JOLs were predicted to vary with the attention
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manipulation such that JOLs were predicted to be higher under full than divided
attention.
Another change was implemented between Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1,
the MOT (Eakin, 2005; Eakin et al., 2003; Eakin & Smith, 2012) was used to guide
participants toward predicting about and retrieving the target from the original list as well
as setting up a strong manipulation of retroactive interference. Using the MOT was
effective in Experiment 1. Specifically, not only was a significant retroactive interference
effect obtained in memory, but the metamemory predictions were solely based on these
retroactive interference effects; there was no effect of the attention manipulation in
DJOLs in Experiment 1. It could be the case that the MOT was the reason no effects of
the encoding factor were observed. That is, during the prediction and the cued-recall test,
the “NOT” hint provided participants with information related to the interference of one
target. For example, seeing SHIRT (not TIE) could override the effect of the encoding
factor by allowing participants to focus in on the interference that TIE has on
remembering TAIL. To test this hypothesis, a condition in which a standard test was
added to the design for Experiment 2. Half of the participants were tested using the MOT
and the other half were tested using a standard cued-recall test; the cue was presented for
prediction about and retrieval of the target, but the “NOT” hint was eliminated from that
test.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 185 undergraduate students at Mississippi State University
recruited through the Psychology Research Program. Eight participants were excluded
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from the analyses for either (a) failing to accurately engage in the divided attention task
or (b) failing to recall a minimum of 20% of the full attention control words (e.g., the best
chance for probability of recall was in this condition; less than 20% recall was fewer than
3 of 15 targets correctly recalled). A breakdown of the remaining 177 participants in each
condition are shown in Table 7. All participants received one credit toward a requirement
in a psychology course.
Table 7
Number of Participants in the Experimental Conditions
Test Type
MOT
Attention
Full
Divided
Total

Standard

JOLs

DJOLs

JOLs

DJOLs

Total

23
23

22
22

25
19

24
19

94
83

46

44

44

43

177

This experiment included two 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (RI Condition:
control, interference) mixed factorial designs, one for the MOT test and one for the
standard test. For each design, Attention was manipulated between subjects and RI
Condition was manipulated within subjects. The dependent variables were probability of
recall, metamemory sensitivity, and metamemory accuracy for JOLs and DJOLs.
Materials
The word lists were the same as in Experiment 1 with the following exception.
Given that there were no differences in Experiment 1 with respect to the lists, for
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Experiment 2, one counterbalanced condition was chosen from each list to be used based
on the results of Experiment 1. Specifically, after examining probability of recall for all
16 conditions (8 for each list), the condition chosen was the one that had the largest
retroactive interference effects in memory. The reason the conditions with the largest
retroactive interference effects were chosen was because those conditions provided the
greatest opportunity for the retrieval factor to influence predictions in Experiment 2. The
eliminated conditions either showed no differences based on any manipulations or had
weak retroactive interference effects. Choosing only one counterbalanced condition for
each list also allowed for more participants in each experimental condition. The standard
recall test was created by eliminating the hint from the MOT test used in Experiment 1.
All other changes were procedural.
Procedure
Participants were treated according to ethical guidelines and provided informed
consent before beginning the experiment. They were seated in a testing station equipped
with a computer, chair, and white noise machine. Participants were first randomly
assigned into one of the Prediction conditions (DJOL versus JOL), one of the Test Type
conditions (MOT versus standard test), and one of the Attention conditions (full versus
divided), for a total of eight counterbalanced conditions. Headphones were moved out of
reach for those in the full attention condition and used for those in the divided attention
condition.
DJOL full attention trial. Prior to studying any experimental word pairs,
participants in the DJOL full attention condition engaged in a practice phase in which
they studied six practice word pairs for 6 s each to familiarize themselves with the
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procedure. Following practice, participants studied both the original and interpolated
encoding lists twice. Participants were instructed to attempt to form a mental image of the
cue and target interacting in some way, and to press “Y” when they formed an image; if
no image was formed, “Y” was not pressed. They also rated their mental image as vivid
(“V”) or not vivid (“N”) following the offset of each pair. After all pairs for both the
original and interpolated encoding lists were studied twice, participants engaged in a
separate prediction phase in which they were given a cue and “NOT hint” (MOT; see
Table 6) or the cue alone (standard test; see Table 8), and gave a prediction about how
likely they were to recall the target that was paired with the presented cue from the
original encoding (first) list. After predictions for all of the original encoding word pairs
were collected, participants completed the cued-recall test in which they were given a cue
and a “NOT hint” (MOT) or the cue alone (standard test) and typed in the target that was
paired with the presented cue on the original encoding list. Participants were then
debriefed and thanked.
DJOL divided attention trial. Participants in the DJOL divided attention
condition followed the same procedure as the DJOL full attention condition with the
following change. The auditory tone discrimination task was implemented during the
original encoding list both times it was studied. Prior to engaging in the practice phase for
the original encoding phase, participants were given detailed instructions about the
divided attention task, and they practiced that task alone. The auditory discrimination task
was as follows: participants heard each tone sequence separately, then together, and then
they practiced clicking the mouse button every time the tone sequence changed.
Following practice, participants completed the original encoding practice phase in which
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they studied practice word pairs while also clicking the mouse button when the tone
sequences changed.
After practice, participants followed the same procedure as the DJOL full
attention condition described above. Specifically, these participants studied the original
and interpolated encoding lists twice (with the auditory discrimination task occurring
during both instances of the original encoding list) but gave predictions in a separate
phase after all pairs were studied. The prediction and test phases occurred with either the
MOT (see Table 6) or the standard test (see Table 8). Like in Experiment 1, the auditory
discrimination task was only implemented during the original encoding phases to prevent
confounding Attention with Retroactive Interference, which would have occurred if the
divided attention task occurred during the interpolated encoding lists.
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WIND - AIR

Original
Encoding
Study Phase
CANDY - BAR

Interpolated
Encoding
Study Phase
WIND - AIR

Original
Encoding Study
Phase 2
CANDY - BAR

Interpolated
Encoding
Study Phase 2
WIND -

DJOL Phase
(0-100)

WIND -

Recall Phase

Interference
SHIRT - TAIL
SHIRT - TIE
SHIRT - TAIL
SHIRT - TIE
SHIRT SHIRT Note. The auditory discrimination task was implemented during both instances of the Original Encoding Study Phase.

Control

RI Condition

DJOL Procedure Implementing the Standard Test during the DJOL and Recall Phases

Table 8
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JOL full attention trial. Participants in the JOL full attention condition followed
the same procedure as the DJOL full attention procedure with the following change.
During the second encoding of both the original and interpolated encoding lists,
participants gave their JOL predictions for each pair. Immediately following the offset of
each cue-target word pair, a cue and “NOT hint” (MOT; see Table 9) or cue alone
(standard test; see Table 10) was presented, and participants gave their JOL prediction
about how likely they would be able to remember the target they just studied on a future
recall test. After the JOL was given, participants then rated their mental image as vivid
(“V”) or not vivid (“N”) as done in the DJOL conditions. JOLs were collected for the
second presentation of the interpolated encoding list to be procedurally equal to the
original encoding list; these JOLs were not analyzed as the word pairs on the interpolated
list were not tested. That is, only JOLs for the original encoding list were analyzed as
those were the pairs on the cued-recall test. Finally, participants engaged in the cuedrecall phase in which they were given a cue and “NOT hint” (MOT) or the cue alone
(standard test) and told to try to recall the target that was paired with the presented cue on
the original (e.g., first) encoding list.
JOL divided attention trial. Participants in the JOL divided attention condition
followed the same encoding procedure as the DJOL divided attention procedure (e.g.,
inclusion of the auditory discrimination task during study of the original encoding list),
but followed the same prediction procedure as the JOL full attention procedure.
Specifically, when studying the original encoding list (both times), participants also
engaged in the auditory tone discrimination task. During the second study phase for both
lists, immediately following the offset of each word pair, participants gave their JOL
91

prediction of the likelihood that they would be able to remember the target they just
studied if given the cue on a test. These predictions were given either with the MOT (see
Table 9) or the standard test (see Table 10).
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Original
Encoding
Study Phase

Interpolated
Encoding
Study Phase

Original Enc + JOL
Study-then-JOL (0-100)

Interpolated Enc + JOL
Study-then-JOL (0-100)

Recall
Phase

WIND - AIR

CANDY - BAR

WIND - AIR

SHIRT - TAIL

Interference

SHIRT - TIE

CANDY - BAR

Interpolated
Encoding
Study Phase

SHIRT - TAIL

WIND - AIR

SHIRT -

WIND -

Original Enc + JOL
Study-then-JOL (0-100)

SHIRT - TIE

CANDY - BAR

SHIRT -

CANDY -

Interpolated Enc + JOL
Study-then-JOL (0-100)

Note. The auditory discrimination task was implemented during both instances of the Original Encoding Study Phase.

WIND - AIR

Original
Encoding
Study Phase

Control

RI
Condition

JOL Procedure Implementing the Standard Test during the Second Encoding and Recall Phases

Table 10

Control

SHIRT -

WIND -

Recall
Phase

WIND CANDY WIND CANDY - BAR
(not COOL)
(not SWEET) (not COOL)
SHIRT SHIRT –
SHIRT Interference
SHIRT - TAIL SHIRT - TIE
SHIRT - TAIL
SHIRT - TIE
(not TIE)
(not TAIL)
(not TIE)
Note. The auditory discrimination task was implemented during both instances of the Original Encoding Study Phase.

RI Condition

JOL Procedure Implementing the MOT during the Second Encoding and Recall Phases

Table 9
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MOT Results
Statistical significance was set at  < .05. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were
conducted for each of the dependent variables—probability of recall, metamemory
sensitivity, and metamemory accuracy. The results for each prediction type, DJOL and
JOL, using the MOT are presented separately because they pertained to Aim 2.
First, to ensure there were no differences in the dependent variables between List
1 and 2 for either the JOL or DJOL conditions, independent-samples t-tests were
conducted on overall probability of recall for the two lists within each metamemory type.
For the DJOL condition, probability of recall for List 1 (M = .59, SE = .04) and List 2 (M
= .55, SE = .04) was not significantly different, t(42) = 0.76, p = .45. Similarly, for the
JOL condition, probability of recall for List 1 (M = .80, SE = .03) and List 2 (M = .80, SE
= .02) was not significantly different, t(44) = -0.04, p = .97. Therefore, results were
collapsed across list for all subsequent analyses.
Probability of Recall
Hypothesis 1 under Aim 2 predicted that typical Attention and Retroactive
Interference effects would be found for probability of recall for both the DJOL and JOL
conditions. Specifically, for both prediction type conditions, memory was predicted to be
better for full than divided attention and better in the control than interference condition.
A 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on probability of recall separately for each
metamemory type. The experimental means are in Table 11.
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Table 11
Experimental Means for Probability of Recall Using the MOT
DJOLs
Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
.71 (.04)
.61 (.04)
Interference
.57 (.04)
.39 (.04)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
.86 (.03)
.86 (.04)

JOLs

Divided
Attention
.75 (.03)
.73 (.04)

DJOL condition. Supporting Hypothesis 1, probability of recall was significantly
better under full (M = .64, SE = .04) than divided (M = .50, SE = .04) attention, F(1, 42) =
7.83, p = .01, ηp2 = .16. Probability of recall was also significantly better for the control
(M = .66, SE = .04) than the interference (M = .50, SE = .04) condition, F(1, 42) = 69.47,
p < .001, ηp2 = .62. As predicted, the interaction between Attention and Retroactive
Interference was not significant, F(1, 42) = 3.58, p = .07, ηp2 = .08. A significant
retroactive interference effect of similar magnitude was obtained for both the divided and
full attention conditions. These findings replicate the probability of recall findings from
Experiment 1 and are shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5.

Experiment 2 probability of recall.

JOL condition. Further supporting Hypothesis 1 and depicted in Figure 5, the
same predicted memory results were obtained for DJOLs were also obtained for JOLs,
but only for the Attention conditions. Probability of recall was significantly better under
full (M = .86, SE = .03) than divided (M = .74, SE = 03) attention, F(1, 44) = 9.96, p =
.003, ηp2 = .19. However, not supporting Hypothesis 1, probability of recall was not
significantly different between the control (M = .81, SE = .02) and interference (M = .79,
SE = .03) conditions, F(1, 44) = 0.32, p = .57, ηp2 =.007. Finally, as predicted, the
interaction between the Attention and Retroactive Interference conditions was not
significant, F(1, 44) = 0.32, p = .57, ηp2 = .007.
Discussion. As expected, participants had better memory when studying under
full than divided attention for both the DJOL and JOL conditions. These findings join
with prior literature showing that memory is better under full than divided attention
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(Craik et al., 1996; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; NavehBenjamin et al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2007). Although a significant retroactive
interference effect was found for the DJOL condition, a result that has been obtained in
prior studies (Eakin, 2005; Leibert & Nelson, 1998; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Rhodes &
Tauber, 2011; Wahlheim, 2011) including Experiment 1, surprisingly, there was no
retroactive interference effect for the JOL condition. This finding was not anticipated; it
was predicted that a retroactive interference effect would be obtained for both
metamemory-type conditions, especially because the MOT was used for the recall test.
The MOT is designed to optimize the potential for interference by making the competing
target explicit in the hint provided with the cue. The theoretical mechanism is that the
second presentation of the interpolated target as the hint on the MOT—both during DJOL
and at test—in conjunction with the cue resulting in a strengthening of that association
over the one between the cue and the original target. This strengthened association results
in the interpolated target, rather than the desired original target, being repeatedly
retrieved and blocking access to the original target in memory.
For Experiment 2, in order to collect JOLs while using the MOT, the typical
implementation of the MOT in the retroactive interference paradigm was modified.
Apparently, this modification inadvertently prevented the impact of retroactive
interference on memory; Table 9 shows the modified paradigm. For the typical paradigm
using the MOT—shown in Table 6—only the interpolated target is used as the hint on the
MOT. Therefore, when the MOT is presented at DJOL and at test, the only association
strengthened is the one between the cue and the interpolated target; the cue and original
target are only presented together once. However, in the modified paradigm, the original
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target was used as the hint during the interpolated JOL and the interpolated target was
used as the hint during the original JOL, strengthening both associations. Because both
associations were strengthened, the effect of further strengthening the association
between the cue and interpolated target on the MOT at recall did not have the same
blocking effect on the original target and did not result in worse memory for the original
target in the interference than in the control condition. This explanation is supported by
the results using the standard recall test discussed in that section, forthcoming. To
preview, a retroactive interference effect was obtained in memory for JOLs when the hint
was not used at prediction or test.
Metamemory Sensitivity
DJOL condition. Hypothesis 2 under Aim 2 predicted that the DJOL magnitude
would not differ between the full and divided attention conditions and that DJOLs would
be higher for the interference than control condition, replicating Experiment 1. A 2
(Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference) repeatedmeasures ANOVA was conducted to examine this hypothesis. Table 12 shows the
experimental means for these conditions.
Table 12
Experimental Means for Metamemory Sensitivity using the MOT
DJOLs
Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
53.68 (6.48)
50.57 (6.18)
Interference 56.55 (6.57)
58.11 (6.27)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.
98

Full
Attention
54.98 (6.28)
49.64 (6.22)

JOLs

Divided
Attention
62.29 (5.76)
54.97 (5.71)

Supporting Hypothesis 2 and replicating Experiment 1, DJOLs were not
significantly different under full (M = 55.11, SE = 5.64) versus divided (M = 54.34, SE =
5.38) attention, F(1, 40) = 0.01, p = .92, ηp2 < .001. In this case, metamemory did not
track the memory findings (e.g., probability of recall was better under full than divided
attention), resulting in a dissociation between memory and metamemory for the Attention
factor. This result further demonstrated that participants were not relying on the encoding
factor when giving DJOL predictions.
Although numerically higher, DJOLs for the interference condition (M = 57.33,
SE = 4.54) were not significantly higher than DJOLs for the control condition (M =
52.12, SE = 4.47), contrary to what was predicted, F(1, 40) = 1.32, p = .26, ηp2 = .03.
Probability of recall was better for the control as compared to the interference condition,
and DJOLs did not track the memory findings for the Retroactive Interference factor,
resulting in a dissociation between memory and metamemory as predicted, but not the
double dissociation that was predicted. However, it is likely that the reason this result did
not reach significance is because of the low sample size (N = 42), resulting in low power
( = .20). Because this finding is numerically in the predicted direction, including more
participants in this condition would likely result in a significant difference in DJOLs
between the control and interference conditions, replicating robust findings by Eakin
(2005), Nelson & Leibert (1998), and Experiment 1. The interaction between the
Attention and Retroactive Interference factors was not significant, F(1, 40) = 0.27, p =
.61, ηp2 = .007. See Figure 6 for a graphical representation of these results.
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Figure 6.

Experiment 2 metamemory sensitivity.

JOL condition. The examination of JOLs under the Attention manipulation is the
critical comparison to determine whether DJOLs were insensitive to factors at encoding
because they occurred in the interval between encoding and retrieval. JOLs were
predicted to be higher under full than divided attention—Hypothesis 3 under Aim 2—
because they were made during the encoding phase, at the same time as the
implementation of the Attention manipulation. JOLs were predicted not to vary between
the control and interference conditions.
Hypothesis 3 was not supported as shown in Figure 6; JOLs under full (M =
52.31, SE = 5.88) and divided attention (M = 58.63, SE = 5.39) were not significantly
different from one another, F(1, 33) = .03, p = .43, ηp2 = .02. Instead, the JOLs tracked
the conditions of retroactive interference, despite the lack of retroactive interference
effects on memory. However, JOLs were significantly higher in the control (M = 58.64,
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SE = 4.26) than in the interference (M = 52.30, SE = 4.22) condition, F(1, 33) = 4.82, p =
.04, ηp2 = .13. The interaction between the Attention and Retroactive Interference factors
was not significant, F(1, 33) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp2 = .004.
Discussion. The surprising result was that, for the JOL condition, metamemory
did not track memory; although probability of recall was better under full than divided
attention, JOLs were similar for the two conditions. JOLs were specifically included in
Experiment 2 to provide the best chance to observe the effect of a manipulation at
encoding on metamemory because they were collected immediately after encoding each
pair under full or divided attention. One potential reason the divided attention
manipulation did not influence JOLs is because people might not have much experience
with the impact of doing a dual task on their memory. In that sense, they might not have
used allocation of attention as the basis of their metamemory predictions. Theoretically,
bases of metamemory that have been identified include Koriat’s (1997) cue-utilization
hypothesis, which states that people use internal cues (e.g., relatedness), extrinsic cues
(e.g., repetition), and mnemonic cues (e.g., familiarity, accessibility to information) to
make metamemory predictions. With respect to the JOL condition, perhaps allocation of
attention—an extrinsic cue in Koriat’s (1997) hypothesis—is not something to which
people have access to when making metamemory predictions.
Conversely, similar to Experiment 1, the Retroactive Interference manipulation at
retrieval could have overshadowed the impact of Attention at encoding. Although the
typical retroactive interference effect was not obtained for memory, JOLs were higher in
the control than interference condition. JOLs could have been higher in the control
condition because the MOT used during the JOL presented two targets with the cue;
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accessibility to multiple targets paired with the cue in the control condition could have
driven the JOLs higher. That same pairing of multiple targets occurred in the interference
condition; however, because the hint on the MOT was actually a previously studied
target, it could have served more as a warning not to base predictions on accessibility to
that target. Prior research has shown that a warning given immediately after exposure to
interfering information can ameliorate its retroactive interference effects in memory
(Eakin et al., 2003). Perhaps the hint had the same warning effect on JOLs.
It is more likely that multiple presentations of the cue in the control condition led
participants to rely on familiarity with the cue, rather accessibility. For example, in their
proactive interference experiment, Metcalfe et al. (1993) found that when a cue was
repeated—regardless of the target paired with it—participants gave higher predictions
than when the cue was not repeated. Eakin (2005) also found that participants gave
higher predictions when a cue was repeated in both the control and interference
conditions. Although cues were also presented multiple times in the interference
condition, familiarity might not have had as strong an influence on JOLs in that
condition. In fact, Eakin (2005) found that retrieval blocking trumped the effects of cue
familiarity in the interference condition of the Retroactive Interference paradigm.
Metamemory Accuracy
DJOL condition. Goodman-Kruskal Gamma correlations were calculated for
each participant between recall accuracy and DJOL magnitude. The overall gamma
correlation for the DJOL condition was .33 (SE = .06), which was significantly different
from zero, t(42) = 8.36, p < .001. Table 13 shows experimental means for these
conditions.
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Hypothesis 4 under Aim 2 stated that DJOLs would be equally accurate for the
full and divided attention conditions but more accurate for the control than the
interference condition; this finding would replicate those from Experiment 1 with regard
to gammas. A 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control,
interference) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted examining metamemory
accuracy as measured using gamma correlations.
Table 13
Experimental Means for Metamemory Accuracy using the MOT
DJOLs

Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
.54 (.12)
.58 (.11)
Interference
.48 (.13)
.45 (.12)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
.51 (.09)
.61 (.10)

JOLs

Divided
Attention
.45 (.08)
.38 (.09)

As expected and shown in Figure 7, participants were equally accurate under full
(M = .51, SE = .09) and divided (M = .51, SE = .09) attention, F(1, 40) < 1. Although
recall was better under full than divided attention, DJOLs did not vary with Attention.
However, gamma correlates recall and DJOLs at the item level, and apparently
participants were able to discriminate between items they would and would not recall at
that level, despite giving equal DJOLs for full and divided attention in the aggregate.
Although the difference in DJOL accuracy between the control (M = .56, SE =
.08) and interference (M = .46, SE = .09) conditions was not significant, F(1, 40) = 0.76,
p = .39, ηp2 = .02, the pattern of data is in the predicted direction, providing at least some
support for Hypothesis 4. Combined with the results from Experiment 1, we can attribute
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the lack of a significant difference to the lower sample size. The typical finding of more
accurate DJOLs for the control than interference condition is robust (e.g., Eakin, 2005;
Nelson & Leibert, 1998; Experiment 1) and would likely have been found with more
participants. As predicted, the interaction between Attention and Retroactive Interference
was not significant, F(1, 40) = 0.10, p = .75, ηp2 = .002.

Figure 7.

Experiment 2 metamemory accuracy.

JOL condition. The overall gamma correlation for the JOL condition was .42 (SE
= .07), which was significantly greater than zero, t(41) = 6.40, p < .001. Hypothesis 5
under Aim 2 predicted that JOLs would be equally accurate for both the full and divided
attention conditions, and also would not vary between the control and interference
conditions. To test Hypothesis 5, a 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive
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Interference: control, interference) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the
JOL condition examining metamemory accuracy by using gamma correlations.
Supporting Hypothesis 5 and depicted in Figure 7, participants were equally
accurate between the full (M = .56, SE = .07) and divided attention (M = .42, SE = .07)
conditions, F (1, 30) = 2.18, p = .15, ηp2 = .07. Additionally, as predicted, there were no
significant differences between the control (M = .48, SE = .06) and interference (M = .50,
SE = .07) conditions, F(1, 30) = 0.05, p = .82, ηp2 = .002. There was no interaction
between Attention and Retroactive Interference, F(1, 30) = 0.91, p = .35, ηp2 = .03.
Discussion. In terms of accuracy, neither the DJOLs nor the JOLs varied with
attention. Apparently, although memory was significantly impacted by dividing attention,
and neither the DJOL nor the JOL sensitivity was, on an item-by-item basis, participants
used other information to discriminate between recallable and unrecallable targets.
DJOLs were equally accurate under retroactive interference, a finding that was
not predicted. However, the 10-point difference between the control and interference
conditions was in the predicted direction; accuracy was higher for the control than
interference condition, if not significantly so. JOLs were equally accurate for the control
and interference conditions. This lack of difference in accuracy supports the idea that the
small, but significant, difference in JOL magnitude between the control and interference
conditions did not critically influence accuracy.
Standard Recall Test Results
The standard recall test is the basic cued-recall test in which a cue is presented
without the addition of the MOT “NOT hint.” Specifically, during the prediction and
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retrieval phases, participants are shown the cue alone and provide their prediction or their
response. See Table 10 for a review of this procedure.
Examining JOLs using the standard test allowed for an examination of both the
encoding and retrieval factors without heightening the interference manipulation through
the use of the MOT. That is, because the “NOT hint” was omitted during the prediction
and retrieval phases, participants were not exposed to a stronger manipulation of
interference, giving the encoding factor equal footing in terms of influencing JOLs in
particular.
Because the DJOL occurs during the retention period, we did not hypothesize that
the use of the standard test would produce different results regarding the Attention
manipulation than had already been obtained on the MOT. In addition, prior research
using the standard recall test has demonstrated the dissociation between DJOLs and
memory in terms of retroactive interference, so no new pattern of results was predicted
regarding the Retroactive Interference manipulation. However, the comparison of this
finding between the MOT and the standard test is presented for completeness in
Appendix C.
Probability of Recall
To test whether there were any differences between List 1 and List 2 for
probability of recall, an independent-samples t-test was conducted for the JOL condition
using the standard test. There was a significant difference in probability of recall; List 1
(M = .73, SE = .04) had significantly higher probability of recall than List 2 (M = .59, SE
= .03), t(42) = 2.70, p = .01. Therefore, List was entered as a covariate for the JOL
condition for the probability of recall results.
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A 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on probability of recall. Table 14 shows the
experimental means for these conditions.
Table 14
Experimental Means for Probability of Recall for the JOL Condition using the Standard
Test
Standard Test
Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
.82 (.04)
.73 (.05)
Interference
.60 (.04)
.46 (.05)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
.86 (.03)
.86 (.04)

MOT

Divided
Attention
.75 (.03)
.73 (.04)

As predicted, and as obtained on the MOT, probability of recall was better under
the full (M = .71, SE = .03) than divided (M = .59, SE = .04) attention condition, F(1, 41)
= 4.87, p = .03, ηp2 = .10. Also as predicted, probability of recall was also significantly
better for the control (M = .78, SE = .03) than the interference (M = .53, SE = .03)
condition, F(1, 42) = 46.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. The interaction between Attention and
Retroactive Interference was not significant, F(1, 42) = 0.46, p = .50, ηp2 = .01. Figure 8
shows a comparison of probability of recall between the standard test and the MOT for
the JOL condition.
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Figure 8.

Probability of recall for the JOL condition using the standard test.

Probability of recall for the MOT included for comparison.
Discussion. Similar to the MOT, on the standard cued recall test recall was better
under full as compared to divided attention, further replicating prior literature on the
effects of dividing attention on memory (Craik et al., 1996; Fernandes & Moscovitch,
2000; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al.,
2007).
Significant retroactive interference effects were obtained memory using the
standard cued recall test. This finding supports the previous supposition that the lack of
retroactive interference effects in the JOL condition using the MOT was due to the
strengthening of both the original and interpolated cue-target word pair by using the
MOT in the modified retroactive interference paradigm. When the hint was eliminated by
using the standard test, competition could still occur due to the pairing of two targets with
the cue, producing retroactive interference effects due to response competition in general
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rather than retrieval blocking, specifically. With respect to Aim 3, at least for the
probability of recall results, both the encoding and retrieval factor affected participants’
recall of the correct targets, supporting Hypothesis 1 under that aim.
Metamemory Sensitivity
Hypothesis 2 under Aim 3 predicted that the finding that JOLs were equal on the
MOT would be eliminated on the standard test. A 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2
(Retroactive Interference: control, interference) repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted on JOL sensitivity in the standard test condition. Table 15 shows the means for
these conditions, as well as the MOT means for comparison.
Table 15
Experimental Means for Metamemory Sensitivity for the JOL Condition using the
Standard Test
Standard Test
Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
63.74 (5.82)
61.70 (5.82)
Interference 68.05 (5.05)
66.95 (5.05)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
54.98 (6.28)
49.64 (6.22)

MOT

Divided
Attention
62.29 (5.76)
54.97 (5.71)

Contrary to Hypothesis 2 under Aim 3, JOLs under the standard test in the full (M
= 65.90, SE = 5.05) and divided (M = 64.32, SE = 5.05) attention conditions did not
significantly differ, F(1, 30) = 0.05, p = .83, ηp2 = .002, although memory was worse for
divided than full attention. Similar to the results obtained on the MOT, this finding
provides further support that metamemory was not based on—or sensitive to—the
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encoding factor, even when the potential influence of retroactive interference was
reduced by eliminated the hint on the MOT by using a standard recall test.
JOLs also did not significantly vary between the control (M = 62.72, SE = 4.12)
and interference (M = 67.50, SE = 3.57) conditions, F(1, 30) = 2.72, p = .11, ηp2 = .08,
showing that JOLs made at encoding were insensitive to the retroactive interference
effects at retrieval. Figure 9 shows a comparison between the standard test and MOT with
respect to metamemory sensitivity.

Figure 9.

JOL sensitivity for the JOL condition using the standard test.

JOL sensitivity for the MOT included for comparison.
Discussion. On the standard recall test, JOLs were relatively consistent regardless
of experimental condition. This result is surprising in terms of JOLs for the Attention
conditions because JOLs were made during the same phase that the attention
manipulation occurred and the MOT was not there to increase focus on the retrieval
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factor. However, even when the MOT was not used at prediction, JOLs were not based
on the allocation of attention during encoding.
Without the MOT at prediction, JOLs were not influenced at all by the
Retroactive Interference manipulation at retrieval. In this sense, not only was the use of
the standard recall test to reduce the possibility of retroactive interference overshadowing
the Attention manipulation successful, but JOLs were seemingly not based on the
retrieval manipulation at all. However, this lack of focus on retroactive interference still
did not result in JOLs based on the Attention factor. This finding supports the supposition
from Experiment 1 that perhaps allocation of attention is not a factor available on which
to base metamemory predictions. Because memory and metamemory were dissociated in
the JOL condition in terms of both the encoding and retrieval factor, JOLs were based on
some factor other than allocation of attention or accessibility.
Metamemory Accuracy
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma correlations were calculated for each participant
between recall accuracy on the standard recall test and their JOLs. The overall gamma
correlation was .33, which was significantly greater than zero, t(40) = 6.87, p < .001.
Because the overall gamma correlation was significantly greater than zero, a 2 (Attention:
full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference) repeated-measures
ANOVA was conducted to examine metamemory accuracy for each experimental
condition. The experimental means are shown in Table 16.
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Table 16
Experimental Means for Metamemory Accuracy for the DJOL Condition using the
Standard Test
Standard Test
Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
.41 (.11)
.49 (.12)
Interference
.22 (.12)
.44 (.12)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
.51 (.09)
.61 (.10)

MOT

Divided
Attention
.45 (.08)
.38 (.09)

Hypothesis 3 under Aim 3 stated that for the standard test, JOLs would be equally
accurate between the full and divided attention conditions because both probability of
recall and JOL sensitivity were predicted to be higher under full than for divided
attention. However, JOLs did not vary between the full (M = .32, SE = .09) and divided
(M = .47, SE = .09) attention conditions, F(1, 29) = 1.34, p = .25, ηp2 = .04. This finding
also replicates both the MOT results and Experiment 1 and is depicted in Figure 10.
Further supporting Hypothesis 3 under Aim 3, JOL accuracy was not significantly
different between the control (M = .45, SE = .08) and interference (M = .33, SE = .08)
conditions, F(1, 29) = 1.24, p = .28, ηp2 = .04, a result that also replicates the MOT
results and Experiment 1; this is also shown in Figure 10. The interaction between
Attention and Retroactive Interference was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.42, p = .52, ηp2 =
.01.
Discussion. Although memory and metamemory were dissociated, on an item-byitem basis, participants were equally able to discriminate between items they would and
would not recall, regardless of experimental condition.
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Figure 10.

JOL accuracy for the JOL condition using the standard test.

JOL accuracy for the MOT included for comparison.

Discussion
Experiment 2 provided some slightly different memory findings than Experiment
1. Although probability of recall was always found to be better in the full than divided
attention condition, retroactive interference effects were only obtained on the MOT in the
DJOL condition, not in the JOL condition. The modification to the retroactive
interference paradigm to collect JOLs contributed to this finding; because the MOT was
presented at prediction and test for both the original and interpolated cue-target word
pairs, both associations were strengthened, reducing the impact of the hint to produce
retrieval blocking on the final test. This explanation is supported by the finding that
significant retroactive interference effects were obtained in the JOL condition on the
standard cued recall test, on which the MOT was eliminated at both prediction and test.
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Experiment 1 was also not fully replicated in terms of metamemory sensitivity.
Even though neither JOLs nor DJOLs varied with attention, as found in Experiment 1, the
typically robust finding that DJOLs are higher for the control than interference condition
of the retroactive interference paradigm was not obtained in Experiment 2. However, the
results were in the predicted direction; lack of significance could be attributed to the
smaller sample size in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1.
JOLs were higher for the control than interference condition when the MOT was
used, replicating Experiment 1. This finding was attributed to either accessibility (Koriat,
1993, 1994)—the MOT associated two targets with control cues—or to cue familiarity
(Metcalfe et al., 1993; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992) because the cues were repeated
multiple times in the control condition. Although cue familiarity could also have
influenced JOLs in the interference condition, the presence of interference overrode cue
familiarity (see Eakin, 2005). Rather, the hint on the MOT served as a warning not to
include the presence of the second target when making JOLs (see Eakin et al., 2003).
This explanation is supported by the finding that JOLs on the standard test did not vary
with retroactive interference. When the hint inherent in the MOT was removed, its
influence on JOLs was also removed.
The most surprising finding was that JOLs did not vary at all with attention.
Experiment 2 was not expected to replicate Experiment 1 in terms of this outcome. JOLs
were predicted to vary with Attention, especially on the standard cued recall test.
However, JOLs never showed any influence on Attention. Even when there was no
influence of retroactive interference on the JOLs—as evidenced using the standard cued
recall test—they still did not vary with attention. This finding provides the strongest
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evidence that metamemory is not based on factors at encoding when factors at retrieval
are also manipulated, even when those retrieval factors seem not to have affected
metamemory.
Neither DJOL nor JOL accuracy varied with attention or retroactive interference,
regardless of the type of test used.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Research on metamemory has been conducted primarily by manipulating factors
that affect the encoding process. Some of these factors include overlearning (Carroll &
Nelson, 1993; Nelson et al., 1982), levels of processing (Lupker et al., 1991), repetition
(Hertzog et al., 2010; Lupker et al., 1991), and attention (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007;
Sacher et al., 2009). There has been little research conducted examining how
metamemory is impacted by factors that affect the retrieval process. The factors that have
been examined include retrieval practice (King et al., 1980), set size (Eakin & Hertzog,
2012b; Schreiber, 1998; Schreiber & Nelson, 1998), and interference (Eakin, 2005;
Leibert & Nelson, 1998; Metcalfe et al., 1993; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011; Wahlheim,
2011). Although there has been research examining the impact of encoding and retrieval
factors on metamemory separately, no research has been conducted examining how
metamemory predictions are impacted when both an encoding and a retrieval factor are
manipulated within the same paradigm. In order to examine this question, experiments
were conducted that crossed an encoding factor, full versus divided attention, with a
retrieval factor, the control versus interference conditions of retroactive interference.
The anticipated effects of both factors on memory were obtained in Experiment 1.
Memory was better under full than divided attention, as has been found in previous
literature (e.g., Craik et al., 1996; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000; Mulligan & Hartman,
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1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2007). For example, Craik et
al. (1996) manipulated when attention was divided at encoding, significant memory
decrements were obtained under divided attention as compared to full attention. They
posited that engaging in an encoding task to remember words for a later test is a
controlled process requiring allocation of attentional resources. When those resources are
divided between two tasks, both tasks compete for resources requiring attention to shift
between the primary and secondary tasks, leading to a memory decrement under divided
attention. This finding was also obtained in Experiment 2 both for the DJOL and JOL
condition, and both for the MOT and standard cued recall test conditions.
Using the MOT in Experiment 1, memory was also found to be worse in the
interference than control condition of the retroactive interference paradigm. McGeoch
(1932) posited that forgetting is primarily due to the interference of competing
information learned between encoding and retrieval, a theory that was born out of the
outdated law of disuse posited by Thorndike (1914). With this theory in mind, when
participants study the interpolated list on which some cues are re-paired with new targets,
these new targets compete for retrieval, given the cue at test. The outcome of this
response competition is a lower likelihood of retrieving the original target when
competing targets are present. This effect is magnified when the interpolated target is
retrieved first. In that case, the pairing of the cue and interpolated target in short-term
memory strengthens the association between them increasing the likelihood that the
interpolated target will be retrieved over the original target on the next attempt
(Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981); the result is retrieval blocking, an especially strong form
of retrieval interference. Although retrieval blocking can occur on a standard cued recall
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test, the use of the MOT capitalizes on this theoretical process by explicitly presenting
the interpolated target as a hint. The presence of the hint ensures that the interpolated
target will be retrieved first in conjunction with the cue, strengthening that association
and increasing the likelihood that retrieval of the original target will be blocked
(Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Eakin et al., 2003; Eakin, 2005).
The only condition in which retroactive interference effects were not obtained in
memory was the JOL condition when the MOT was used. Modifying the typical
retroactive interference paradigm to accommodate making JOLs resulted in equally
strengthening the association between the cue and the original and interpolated targets.
This increased association strength dampened the ability of the MOT at test to set up
retrieval blocking of the original target. The strengthened association between the cue
and the original target essentially eliminated the retroactive interference effect. This
explanation was further supported by the finding that retroactive interference effects were
obtained in memory in the JOL condition using the standard cued recall test.
The primary purpose of the two experiments reported was to determine the degree
to which factors at encoding and retrieval impacted metamemory when both were
manipulated in the same paradigm. Metamemory sensitivity was never found to be
impacted by the attention manipulation. In Experiment 1, despite better memory under
full than divided attention, DJOL sensitivity was similar for both attention conditions. In
Experiment 2, JOLs were added because, as predictions made during the encoding
manipulations, they were theorized to be more likely to be influenced by the attention
factor than DJOLs. However, JOLs did not vary with attention.
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Metamemory sensitivity was almost exclusively influenced by retroactive
interference. In Experiment 1, DJOLs were higher under the control than interference
condition; metamemory and memory were dissociated under retroactive interference.
This dissociation was anticipated; prior research comparing memory and metamemory
under retroactive interference without an attention manipulation has obtained the same
dissociation (Eakin, 2005). This dissociation is explained in terms of a cue-based,
heuristic account of the bases of metamemory (Schwartz, 1994). Koriat’s (1993, 1994)
accessibility heuristic explains why DJOLs were higher for the interference than control
condition in Experiments 1 and 2. The accessibility heuristic states that predictions are
based on how much information comes to mind when a cue is presented. For the
interference condition, because the cue was paired with two targets, more information
was accessible given the interpolated than the original cue. Although a careful assessment
of the two targets accessed might demonstrate that one is incorrect, because the heuristic
is cue based, only the fact that more information is accessible serves as the basis of the
prediction. In addition, as Koriat (1993, 1994) stated, although access to accurate
information improves metamemory accuracy, predictions are based on the amount of
information accessed whether that information is accurate or not. In this case, the
information accessed and on which metamemory is based is not diagnostic of the effect
this information will have on memory; this same information will later produce
interference effects on memory.
Even when retroactive interference effects were not produced in memory for the
JOL condition using the MOT in Experiment 2, the JOLs themselves were still influenced
by accessibility to multiple targets, but not in the same direction as for the DJOLs. In this
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case, JOLs were higher for the control than the interference. Because the MOT was used
to collect JOLs, in the control condition, participants saw an additional unstudied target
as the “NOT hint.” Therefore, accessibility to multiple targets paired with the cue in the
control condition may have served to increase JOLs for the control condition. In the
interference condition, although people also had access to multiple targets, because the
hint was a previously studied target, it may have served as a warning to not base
predictions on that factor, resulting in lower predictions than in the control condition
(Eakin et al., 2003). Alternatively, multiple presentations of the cue in the control
condition may have led participants to rely on cue familiarity as the basis of their JOLs.
Metcalfe et al. (1993) found that participants gave higher predictions when a cue was
repeated, regardless of what target was associated with that cue. Although the cues were
also repeated in the interference condition, cue familiarity might have been overridden by
retrieval blocking in that condition (Eakin, 2005).
When the standard cued recall test was used in Experiment 2, although significant
retroactive interference effects were obtained in memory, there was no effect of
retroactive interference on the JOLs. In the absence of the MOT at prediction, JOLs made
at encoding were insensitive to the retroactive interference effects that would be obtained
at retrieval. This finding is consistent with those on set-size-effects showing that JOLs
were not sensitive to the implicit interference effects obtained at retrieval (Eakin &
Hertzog, 2012b). However, JOLs in this condition still did not vary with the attention
manipulation.
Because memory and metamemory were dissociated under both the attention and
retroactive interference manipulations in Experiment 1, metamemory accuracy might be
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expected to be poor overall. However, metamemory accuracy is calculated on an item-byitem basis and is the correlation of predicted memory and actual memory outcome.
Although it might not vary in the aggregate across experimental conditions in the
expected way, because predictions could have been based on other factors, discrimination
between targets that would and would not be remembered on an individual basis could
still be accurate. Therefore, although metamemory sensitivity never varied significantly
with attention even when memory did, metamemory accuracy was similar for the full and
divided attention conditions in nearly all cases (DJOLs were numerically more accurate
for full than divided attention in Experiment 1).
Metamemory accuracy always varied with retroactive interference for DJOLs. In
Experiment 1, DJOLs were more accurate for the control than interference condition, a
finding that further supports the differential influence of accessibility (Koriat, 1993,
1994) on metamemory sensitivity and memory. The dissociation between memory and
metamemory is evidenced by lower gammas for the interference than control conditions
of the retroactive interference paradigm. Although the difference was not significant in
Experiment 2, the mean difference was in the predicted direction. Conversely, JOL
accuracy never varied with retroactive interference. Whether memory in the JOL
condition was influenced by retroactive interference using the MOT (memory was better
for the control than interference condition) or not when using the standard cued recall
test, JOL accuracy was similar for the control and interference conditions.
The Attention Manipulation
The finding that both DOLs and JOLs were not influenced by the encoding
manipulation was surprising. First, this result does not replicate the limited prior literature
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on metamemory under divided attention (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007; Sacher et al., 2009)
or Pilot 2. It was presumed that the lack of an effect of attention on metamemory in
Experiment 1 was due to using a metamemory measure made after the encoding phase.
However, JOLs, a metamemory measure made during the encoding phase, also showed
no effect of attention. Attention is thought to be a theoretically important factor during
the encoding process with dividing attention resulting in poorer memory (Craik et al.,
1996; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et
al., 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2007). It is not intuitive that even metamemory
predictions made during the encoding process did not vary between full and divided
attention. Although Koriat (1997) suggested that people used extrinsic cues, which are
contextual details about the experiment, when making their metamemory predictions,
apparently allocation of attention is not one of those cues. If this is the case, even if
people notice the attention manipulation, they are unable to infer the detriment on
memory due to dividing attention. The literature on metamemory for attention can inform
this discussion.
Reisberg and McLean (1985) examined meta-attention by having participants
solve arithmetic problems while being distracted by an auditory stimulus (e.g., a comedy
clip). Participants were aware that they would be hearing the comedy clip; they were told
to ignore it. Following each arithmetic problem, participants judged how much of the
comedy clip they heard (0% = none of the clip heard to 100% = all of the clip heard) and
how disrupted they believed they were due to the distraction (0 = not disrupted at all to 5
= completely disrupted Likert-type scale). Results indicated that participants’ distraction
ratings were uncorrelated with both their perception of how much of the comedy clip they
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heard (the 0-100% rating) and their response latencies. These findings suggested that
participants were unable to adequately gauge how distracted they were on an item-byitem or global level. In a second Experiment, Reisberg and McLean found that providing
participants with a monetary incentive to ignore the distractor resulted in lower ratings of
how much of the comedy clip was heard, but did not decrease participants’ ratings of how
distracted they were. These findings demonstrated that participants were inaccurate at
monitoring their attention. Reisberg and McLean’s (1985) findings on meta-attention can
help explain the lack of difference in metamemory predictions between the full and
divided attention conditions. If participants are unable to monitor that they were being
distracted by the divided attention task, predictions in the full and divided attention
conditions would not differ.
The fact that DJOLs varied with attention in the pilot experiment when attention
was manipulated in isolation, but not when combined with the retroactive interference
manipulation suggests an alternative explanation. For the DJOLs at least, the presence of
the retroactive interference manipulation could have overpowered the effects of the
attention manipulation. Especially when the MOT was used, the potential influence of
retroactive interference could have been stronger than that of the attention manipulation.
Although the attention manipulation was not subtle—it was, in fact, quite intrusive and
reportedly annoying—the fact that metamemory was impacted more by the retroactive
interference manipulation suggest that its factors were the predominant influence on the
heuristics used to make metamemory predictions. More on this point will be discussed in
the next section.
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One potential issue with the implementation of the attention manipulation was
that it was manipulated between subjects. It is possible that because each participant only
experienced either full or divided attention, they could not use comparative evidence to
inform their metamemory predictions. The decision was made to use a between-subjects
manipulation because, in an unreported pilot study, completing both a full and divided
attention condition using a retroactive interference paradigm resulted in extreme fatigue
on the part of participants; the second phase, regardless of which attention manipulation
was implemented, yielded unusable memory results. Therefore, a within-subjects
manipulation of attention was not used in the present experiments. However, despite the
reasoning behind the decision to manipulate attention between subjects, this factor could
be why attention had no effect on metamemory.
Although it is possible that not having a full attention condition with which to
compare performance resulted in the lack of effort of attention on metamemory, it is still
reasonable to expect that participating in the divided attention condition—in which one
had to focus on an annoying series of tones while also studying the encoding word
pairs—would have led to low predictions. As the findings for metamemory sensitivity
show, that was never the case—even for JOLs made during the divided attention task.
The conclusion is that metamemory is simply not sensitive to manipulations at encoding
when an additional, and perhaps overshadowing, manipulation at retrieval is included in
the same paradigm.
The Retroactive Interference Manipulation
The finding that metamemory was not influenced by the encoding factor of
attention was surprising. That it was influenced by the retrieval factor was not. Prior
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research had shown that DJOLs were dissociated from memory under retroactive
interference (Eakin, 2005); DJOLs were higher in the interference than control condition
whereas memory was better in the control than in the interference condition. That
dissociation was replicated for DJOLs in Experiments 1 and 2, although the difference
was not significant in Experiment 2. These results are explained by the accessibility
heuristic (Koriat, 1993, 1994). Koriat (1993, 1994) theorized that metamemory
predictions were cue-based and based on the heuristic that the amount of information
accessible when the cue was presented is predictive of future memory outcome.
According to the accessibility heuristic, when the interference condition cue was
presented, because it was associated with two targets, more information was accessible
given the interference cue as compared to the control cue, resulting in higher predictions.
Because the heuristic is cue-based, no examination of the accuracy of the accessed
information is required (Koriat, 1994). Therefore, DJOLs were higher based on the same
information that would later lead to lower memory, producing the dissociation.
The results for JOLs was different from those for DJOLs; however, they can still
be accounted for by the accessibility heuristic. JOLs varied with retroactive interference
when the interference manipulation was evident at encoding by using the MOT during
the prediction phase. However, the JOLs did not vary in the same way as DJOLs; JOLs
were higher in the control than in the interference condition. JOLs could have been
higher in the control condition because the MOT used during the JOL presented two
targets with the cue. Similar to the DJOLs, accessibility to multiple targets paired with
the cue in the control condition could have led to higher JOLs in that condition. Multiple
targets were also paired with the cue in the interference condition; however, because the
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hint on the MOT was actually a previously studied target, it could have served as a
warning not to base the JOL on accessibility to that target. Prior research has shown that
an immediate warning given after exposure to interfering information can eliminate its
retroactive interference effects in memory (Eakin et al., 2003). The hint could have had
the same warning effect on metamemory for the JOLs.
It is also possible, and perhaps more probable, that multiple presentations of the
cue in the control condition created a sense of familiarity with the cue that informed JOL
magnitude. Metcalfe et al. (1993) demonstrated that repeated cues garnered higher
predictions than cues that were not repeated. JOLs could have relied on familiarity due to
repeating cues in the interference condition as well, but as Eakin (2005) found, retrieval
blocking overshadows any effects of cue familiarity under retroactive interference.
The fact that JOLs were influenced by retroactive interference—even when
memory was not—provides further support that metamemory is based on heuristics such
as accessibility (Koriat, 1993, 1994) and familiarity (Metcalfe et al., 1993), rather than on
direct access to the memory trace. As Nelson and Narens (1990) described, the metalevel holds the representation of the object-level as informed by the monitoring process.
The representation is updated based on monitoring, but what is being monitored is not the
actual state of the memory trace at the object-level. What is monitored is characteristics
of the memory process, such as intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic cues (Koriat, 1997).
The dissociation between memory and metamemory for both DJOLs and JOLs are
evidence of this monitoring of these cues informing the meta-level.
JOLs were not influenced by retroactive interference when the standard cued
recall test was used. With the elimination of the hint in the MOT to introduce interference
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at prediction, JOLs were unaffected by the retroactive interference that would later occur
in memory. However, it should be noted that even in this condition the JOLs were also
not influenced by the attention manipulation. JOL sensitivity was relatively stable across
all the experimental conditions indicating that they were based on some other factor than
those being manipulated in the present experiments.
Answering the Aims
The main goal of the experiments presented was to determine whether
metamemory predictions were influenced by factors at encoding or at retrieval when
factors at both were manipulated in the same paradigm. The conclusion is definitively
that factors at retrieval provide more influence—even exclusive influence—on
metamemory, even when both factors influence memory. The attention manipulation at
encoding was previously demonstrated to impact metamemory, in a pilot study reported
herein and in previous research (Barnes & Dougherty, 2007; Sacher et al., 2009).
However, when combined with a retroactive interference manipulation at retrieval, there
was no evidence of any influence of the encoding factor; metamemory was solely
affected by the retrieval factor. This finding was obtained even for metamemory
predictions that were collected during the encoding phase. Even in one condition in
which metamemory was not influenced by the retrieval factor, there was no evidence of
influence from the encoding factor.
Although an alternative explanation was that people are not able to assess the
impact of allocation of attention on their memory, this explanation is belied by prior
research showing that they can (Pilot 2; Barnes & Dougherty, 2007; Sacher et al., 2009).
Apparently, the retroactive interference manipulation using the retroactive paradigm itself
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had a stronger impact on metamemory than the attention manipulation at encoding.
Although retroactive interference effects are observed at retrieval, the factors that
contribute to it are evidenced earlier in the paradigm. During the interpolated study
phase, because the MOT was used during prediction, the impact of having processed two
targets with some of the cues could be experienced well before retrieval, as evidenced by
DJOLs that are higher in the interference condition and JOLs that are higher in the
control condition when the MOT is used. When the standard recall test was used,
removing some of the evidence of the potential for interference during the study phase,
metamemory was no longer different for the retroactive interference conditions. For this
reason, to fully answer the aims of this dissertation, another factor at retrieval might need
to be examined.
Future Directions
In order to determine whether the findings of the present experiments that
metamemory was not based on encoding factors when retrieval factors were also
manipulated was due to the specific materials and procedure of the retroactive
interference paradigm, a retrieval factor that is not confounded with the procedure and
materials used in the paradigm that produces the effect at retrieval needs to be used.
Perhaps a fruitful manipulation would be that of set size (Schreiber, 1998; Schreiber &
Nelson, 1998; Eakin & Hertzog, 2012b). Associative set size is a factor that produces
interference effects at retrieval; however, people are not able to explicitly determine the
associative set size of a word. Therefore, during the encoding phase, there would be
nothing during the prediction phase that would signal the future potential for interference
effects at retrieval. Prior research has shown that DJOLs at retrieval, but not JOLs at
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encoding, were sensitive to the implicit interference effects resulting from associative set
size manipulations. Future research could cross an associative set size manipulation with
the manipulation of an encoding factor. Attention would not serve as a sufficient
manipulation, however, because metamemory would be predicted to be associated with
both the encoding and retrieval factor. A factor at encoding that would lead to a
dissociation between memory and metamemory would be ideal. However, none of the
known encoding manipulations have that result.
Conclusion
The main conclusion from the two experiments presented is that metamemory
was only impacted by the retrieval factor when an encoding factor was also manipulated
in the same paradigm. The findings support Koriat’s (1993, 1994) accessibility heuristic
hypothesis; predictions were based on the amount of information that was accessible,
although when the predictions was made determined the direction of the influence in
terms of the retroactive interference conditions.

129

REFERENCES
Arbuckle, T. Y., & Cuddy, L. L. (1969). Discrimination of item strength at time of
presentation. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 81(1), 126-131. doi:
10.1037/h0027455
Barnes, K. A., & Dougherty, M. R. (2007). The effect of divided attention on global
judgment of learning accuracy. American Journal of Psychology, 120(3), 347359. doi: 10.2307/20445409
Begg, I., Duft, S., Lalonde, P., Melnick, R., & Savito, J. (1989). Memory predictions are
based on ease of processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 28(5), 610-632.
doi: 10.1016/0749-596X(89)90016-8
Carroll, M., & Nelson, T. O. (1993). Effect of overlearning on the feeling of knowing is
more detectable in within-subject than in between-subject designs. American
Journal of Psychology, 106(2), 227-235. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.125.2.159
Craik, F. I. M., Govoni, R., Naveh-Benjamin, M., & Anderson, N. D. (1996). The effects
of divided attention on encoding and retrieval processes in human memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125(2), 159-180.
Dunlosky, J., & Bjork, R. A. (2008). The integrated nature of metamemory and memory.
In J. Dunlosky & R. A. Bjork (Eds.), Handbook of Metamemory and Memory (pp.
11-28). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

130

Dunlosky, J., & Matvey, G. (2001). Empirical analysis of the intrinsic-extrinsic
distinction of judgments of learning (JOLs): Effects of relatedness and serial
position on JOLs. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 27(5), 1180-1191. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.27.5.1180
Dunlosky, J., & Metcalfe, J. (2009). Metacognition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, Inc.
Dunlosky, J., & Nelson, T. O. (1992). Importance of the kind of cue for judgments of
learning (JOL) and the delayed-JOL effect. Memory & Cognition, 20(4), 374-380.
doi: 10.3758/BF03210921
Dunlosky, J., & Nelson, T. O. (1997). Similarity between the cue for judgments of
learning (JOL) and the cue for test is not the primary determinant of JOL
accuracy. Journal of Memory and Language, 36(1), 34-49. doi:
10.1006/jmla.1996.2476
Dunlosky, J., & Thiede, K. W. (2004). Causes and constraints of the shift-to-easiermaterials effect in the control of study. Memory & Cognition, 32(5), 779-788. doi:
10.3758/BF03195868
Eakin, D. K. (2005). Illusions of knowing: Metamemory and memory under conditions of
retroactive interference. Journal of Memory and Language, 52(4), 526-534. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2005.01.009
Eakin, D. K. (2010). ListChecker Pro 1.2: A program designed to facilitate creating word
lists using the University of South Florida word association norms. Behavior
Research Methods, 42(4), 1012-1021. doi: 10.3758/BRM.42.4.1012

131

Eakin, D. K., & Hertzog, C. (2012a). Age invariance in feeling of knowing during
implicit interference effects. The Journals of Gerontology, Series B:
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67(5), 555-562. doi:
10.1092/geronb/gbr150
Eakin, D. K., & Hertzog, C. (2012b). Immediate judgments of learning are insensitive to
implicit interference effects at retrieval. Memory & Cognition, 40(1), 8-18. doi:
10.3758/s13421-011-0138-4
Eakin, D. K., Schreiber, T. A., & Sergent-Marshall, S. (2003). Misinformation effects in
eyewitness memory: The presence and absence of memory impairment as a
function of warning and misinformation accessibility. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(5), 813-825. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.29.5.813
Eakin, D. K., & Smith, R. (2012). Retroactive interference effects in implicit memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(5),
1419-1424. doi: 10.1037/a0027208
Fernandes, M. A., & Moscovitch, M. (2000). Divided attention and memory: Evidence of
substantial interference effects at retrieval and encoding. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 129(2), 155-176. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.129.2.155
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitivedevelopmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911. doi:
10.1037/003-066X.34.10.906
Gilliland, A. R. (1948). The rate of forgetting. Journal of Educational Psychology, 39(1),
19-26. doi: 10.1037/h0061032
132

Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of
Educational Psychology, 56(4), 208-216. doi: 10.1037/h0022263
Hart, J. T. (1967). Memory and the memory-monitoring process. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6(5), 685-691. doi: 10.1016/S00225371(67)80072-0
Hertzog, C., Dunlosky, J., & Sinclair, S. M. (2010). Episodic feeling-of-knowing
resolution derives form the quality of original encoding. Memory & Cognition,
38(6), 771-784. doi: 10.3758/MC.38.6.771
King, J. F., Zechmeister, E. B., & Shaughnessy, J. J. (1980). Judgments of knowing: The
influence of retrieval practice. American Journal of Psychology, 93(2), 329-343.
doi: 10.2307/1422236
Kimball, D. R., & Metcalfe, J. (2003). Delaying judgments of learning affects memory,
not metamemory. Memory & Cognition, 31(6), 918-929. doi:
10.3758/BF03196445
Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that we know? The accessibility model of the feeling
of knowing. Psychological Review, 100(4), 609-639. doi: 10.1037/0033295X.100.4.609
Koriat, A. (1994). Memory's knowledge of its own knowledge: The accessibility account
of the feeling of knowing. In J. Metcalfe & A. P. Shimamura (Eds.),
Metacognition: Knowing about knowing (pp. 115-135). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.

133

Koriat, A. (1995). Dissociating knowing and the feeling of knowing: Further evidence for
the accessibility model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(3),
311-333. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.124.3.311
Koriat, A. (1997). Monitoring one's own knowledge during study: A cue-utilization
approach to judgments of learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
126(4), 349-370. doi: 10.1037/0096/3445.126.4.349
Koriat, A. (1998). Metamemory: The feeling of knowing and its vagaries. In M.
Sabourin, F. I. M. Craik & M. Robert (Eds.), Advances in Psychological Science
(Vol. 2, pp. 461-469). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A. (2005). Illusions of competence in monitoring one's
knowledge during study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 31(2), 187-194. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.187
Koriat, A., & Levy-Sadot, R. (2001). The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity
and accessibility heuristic to feelings of knowing. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(1), 34-53. doi: 10.1037/02787393.27.1.34
Leibert, T. W., & Nelson, D. L. (1998). The roles of cue and target familiarity in making
feeling-of-knowing judgments. American Journal of Psychology, 111(1), 63-75.
doi: 10.2307/1423537
Le Ny, J.-F., Denhiere, G., & Taillanter, D. L. (1972). Regulation of study-time and
interstimulus similarity in self-paced learning conditions. Acta Psychologica,
36(4), 280-289. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(72)90012-1

134

Lovelace, E. A. (1984). Metamemory: Monitoring future recallability during study.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10(4),
756-766. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.10.4.756
Lupker, S. J., Harbluk, J. L., & Patrick, A. S. (1991). Memory for things forgotten.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17(5),
897-907. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.17.5.897
Mazzoni, G., & Cornoldi, C. (1993). Strategies in study time allocation: Why is study
time sometimes not effective? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
122(1), 47-60. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.122.1.47
McGeoch, J. A. (1932). Forgetting and the law of disuse. Psychological Review, 39(4),
352-370. doi: 10.1037/h0069819
Metcalfe, J. (2002). Is study time allocated selectively to a region of proximal learning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131(3), 349-363. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.131.3.349
Metcalfe, J., & Finn, B. (2008). Familiarity and retrieval processes in delayed judgments
of learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 34(5), 1084-1097. doi: 10.1037/a0012580
Metcalfe, J., & Kornell, N. (2003). The dynamics of learning and allocation of study time
to a region of proximal learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
132(4), 530-542. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.132.4.530
Metcalfe, J., & Kornell, N. (2005). A region of proximal learning model of study time
allocation. Journal of Memory and Language, 52(4), 463-477. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2004.12.001
135

Metcalfe, J., Schwartz, B. L., & Joaquim, S. G. (1993). The cue-familiarity heuristic in
metacognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 19(4), 851-861. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.19.4.851
Mulligan, N. W., & Hartman, M. (1996). Divided attention and indirect memory tests.
Memory & Cognition, 24(4), 453-465. doi: 10.3758/BF03200934
Naveh-Benjamin, M., Craik, F. I. M., Guez, J., & Dori, H. (1998). Effects of divided
attention on encoding and retrieval processes in human memory: Further support
for asymmetry. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 24(5), 1091-1104. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.24.5.1091
Naveh-Benjamin, M., Guez, J., & Sorek, S. (2007). The effect of divided attention on
encoding processes in memory: Mapping the locus of interference. Canadian
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(1), 1-12. doi: 10.1037/cjep2007001
Nelson, D. L., McEvoy, C. L., & Schreiber, T. A. (1998). The University of South
Florida free association, rhyme, and word fragment norms. Behavior Research
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36(3), 402-407. doi: 10.3758/BF03195588
Nelson, D. L., McKinney, V. M., Gee, N. R., & Janczura, G. A. (1998). Interpreting the
influence of implicitly activated memories on recall and recognition.
Psychological Review, 105(2), 299-324. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.105.2.299
Nelson, D. L., Schreiber, T. A., & McEvoy, C. L. (1992). Processing implicit and explicit
representations. Psychological Review, 99(2), 322-348. doi: 10.1037/0033285X.99.2.322

136

Nelson, T. O., & Dunlosky, J. (1991). When people's judgments of learning (JOLs) are
extremely accurate at predicting subsequent recall: The “delayed-JOL effect.”
Psychological Science, 2(4), 267-270. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1991.tb00147.x
Nelson, T. O., Gerler, D., & Narens, L. (1984). Accuracy of feeling-of-knowing
judgments for predicting perceptual identification and relearning. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 113(2), 282-300. doi: 10.1037/00963445.113.2.282
Nelson, T. O., & Leonesio, R. J. (1988). Allocation of self-paced study time and the
“labor-in-vain effect.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 14(4), 676-686. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.14.4.676
Nelson, T. O., Leonesio, R. J., Shimamura, A. P., Landwehr, R. F., & Narens, L. (1982).
Overlearning and the feeling of knowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 8(4), 279-288. doi: 10.1037/02787393.8.4.279
Nelson, T. O., & Narens, L. (1990). Metamemory: A theoretical framework and new
findings. In G. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation:
Advances in research and theory (Vol. 26, pp. 125-173). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Nhouyvanisvong, A., & Reder, L. M. (1998). Rapid feeling-of-knowing: A strategy
selection mechanism. In V. Y. Yzerbyt, G. Lories, & B. Dardenne (Eds.),
Metacognition: Cognitive and Social Dimension (pp. 35-52). London, UK: Sage.

137

Price, J., Hertzog, C., Dunlosky, J. (2010). Self-regulated learning in younger and older
adults: Does aging affect metacognitive control? Aging, Neuropsychology, and
Cognition, 17(3), 329-359. doi: 10.1080/13825580903287941
Raaijmakers, J. G. W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1981). Search of associative memory.
Psychological Review, 88(2), 93-134. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.88.2.93
Reder, L. M. (1987). Strategy selection in question answering. Cognitive Psychology,
19(1), 90-138. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(87)90005-3
Reder, L. M. (1988). Strategic control of retrieval strategies. In Bower, G. (Ed.), The
psychology of Learning and Motivation, (Vol. 22, pp. 227-259). New York, NY:
Academic Press
Reder, L. M., & Ritter, F. E. (1992). What determines initial feeling of knowing?
Familiarity with question terms, not with the answer. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(3), 435-451. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.18.3.435
Reisberg, D., & McLean, D. (1985). Meta-attention: Do we know when we are being
distracted? The Journal of General Psychology, 112(3), 291-306. doi:
10.1080/00221309.1985.9711015
Rhodes, M. G., & Tauber, S. K. (2011). The influence of delaying judgments of learning
on metacognitive accuracy: A meta-analytic review. Psychological Bulletin,
137(1), 131-148. doi: 10.1037/a0021705
Sacher, M., Taconnat, L., Souchay, C., & Isingrini, M. (2009). Divided attention at
encoding: Effect on feeling-of-knowing. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(3),
754-761. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.04.001
138

Schreiber, T. A. (1998). Effects of target set size on feelings of knowing and cued recall:
Implications for the cue effectiveness and partial-retrieval hypotheses. Memory &
Cognition, 26(3), 553-571. doi: 10.3758/BF03201162
Schreiber, T. A., & Nelson, D. L. (1998). The relation between feelings of knowing and
the number of neighboring concepts linked to the test cue. Memory & Cognition,
26(5), 869-883. doi: 10.3758/BF03201170
Schwartz, B. L. (1994). Sources of information in metamemory: Judgments of learning
and feelings of knowing. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 1, 357-375. doi:
10.3758-BF03213977
Schwartz, B. L., & Metcalfe, J. (1992). Cue familiarity but not target retrievability
enhances feeling-of-knowing judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(5), 1074-1083. doi: 10.1037/02787393.18.5.1074
Son, L. K., & Metcalfe, J. (2000). Metacognitive and control strategies in study-time
allocation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 26(1), 204-221. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.26.1.204
Thiede, K. W., & Dunlosky, J. (1999). Toward a general model of self-regulated study:
An analysis of selection of items for study and self-paced study time. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25(4), 1024-1037.
doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.25.4.1024
Thorndike, E. L. (1914) Educational Psychology. New York, NY: Teachers College,
Columbia University.

139

Underwood, B. J. (1966). Individual and group predictions of item difficulty for free
learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71(5), 673-679.
doi:10.1037/h0023107
Wahlheim, C. N. (2011). Predicting memory performance under conditions of proactive
interference: Immediate and delayed judgments of learning. Memory &
Cognition, 39(5), 827-838. doi: 10.3758/s13421-010-0065-9
Zacks, R. T. (1969). Invariance of total learning time under different conditions of
practice. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 82(3), 441-447.
doi:10.1037/h0028369

140

WORD LISTS USED IN EXPERIMENTS

141

Table 17
List 1 Cue-Target Word Pairs
First Pair

Second Pair

Interpolated Control

WIND - AIR
FOCUS - CAMERA
WANTED - DEAD
CYCLE - RIDE
WAGE - SALARY
CONCRETE - SALARY
SPOTS – DALMATIAN
HOLIDAY - VACATION
ENGLAND - BRITAIN
HUMBLE - MODEST
TRAY - CAFETERIA
FORMAL - TUX
FOAM - SEA
DISCUSSION - LECTURE
DENIAL - LIE
TRAFFIC - LIGHT
GOLF - TENNIS
SAYING - PHRASE
SHIRT - TAIL
VALLEY - HILL
FACTS - OPINIONS
WIDOW - LONELY
CHANCE - TRY
CREATIVE - ARTISTIC
PRICE - EXPENSIVE
TONIGHT - EVENING
CONSCIOUS - AWAKE
AIRCRAFT - CARRIER
HUNTING - SHOOT
CHAIN - LOCK

WIND - COOL
FOCUS - EYES
WANTED - DESIRE
CYCLE - MOTOR
WAGE - EARN
CONCRETE - SIDEWALK
SPOTS - DOTS
HOLIDAY - CHRISTMAS
ENGLAND - FRANCE
HUMBLE - QUIET
TRAY - LUNCH
FORMAL - INFORMAL
FOAM - BATH
DISCUSSION - ARGUMENT
DENIAL - REFUSE
TRAFFIC - SIGNAL
GOLF - SPORT
SAYING - TALKING
SHIRT - TIE
VALLEY - GIRLS
FACTS - FICTION
WIDOW - ALONE
CHANCE - LUCK
CREATIVE - IMAGINATIVE
PRICE - AMOUNT
TONIGHT - TOMORROW
CONSCIOUS - AWARE
AIRCRAFT - PILOT
HUNTING - FISHING
CHAIN - GANG

CANDY - BAR
EXECUTIVE - BOSS
DARE - DEVIL
CERTAIN - POSITIVE
DECREASE - LOWER
FURTHER - DISTANCE
GENUINE - UNIQUE
INSTRUCTION - FOLLOW
WISDOM - INTELLIGENT
NATIVE - INDIAN
IDEAL - PERFECT
BARN - COW
ORGAN - HEART
SINK - DISHES

Note. The first and second pairs could serve as Original Encoding Control or Interference
pairs or Interpolated Encoding Interference pairs. The Interpolated Control pairs
remained static across the conditions.
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Table 18
List 2 Cue-Target Word-Pairs
First Pair

Second Pair

Interpolated Control

FASHION - DESIGN
PREFER - CHOICE
GRANT - SCHOLARSHIP
MILLION - TRILLION
GUILT - SORRY
SHOCK - SCARE
JURY - JUDGE
RECENT - YESTERDAY
RUNNING - JOGGING
SHEETS - PAPER
OUTCOME - FINISH
ARMS - HANDS
WASTE - THROW
SCREW - NUTS
CONSTANT - CONTINUOUS
ENGLISH - LANGUAGE
TEA - LEAVES
HALF - MOON
LIBERAL - DEMOCRATIC
CARDINAL - BISHOP
ABSENT - SICK
COUPLE - PAIR
AUDIENCE - APPLAUSE
FAMOUS - CELEBRITY
EAGER - ANXIOUS
APPOINTMENT - MEETING
IMPULSE - QUICK
RESERVE - SAVE
STATION - RADIO
MISSION - IMPOSSIBLE

FASHION - STATEMENT
PREFER - CHOOSE
GRANT - LOAN
MILLION - BILLION
GUILT - INNOCENCE
SHOCK - ELECTRICITY
JURY - TRIAL
RECENT - LATELY
RUNNING - WALKING
SHEETS - BLANKET
OUTCOME - FINAL
ARMS - WEAPONS
WASTE - BASKET
SCREW - DRIVER
CONSTANT - STEADY
ENGLISH - SPANISH
TEA - CUP
HALF - FULL
LIBERAL - CONSERVATIVE
CARDINAL - SIN
ABSENT - MISSING
COUPLE - MARRIAGE
AUDIENCE - CLAP
FAMOUS - INFAMOUS
EAGER - WILLING
APPOINTMENT - SCHEDULE
IMPULSE - SPONTANEOUS
RESERVE - KEEP
STATION - WAGON
MISSION - ACCOMPLISHED

CAPITAL - LETTERS
EXTENSION - PHONE
RESPONSIBLE - ADULT
MANUFACTURE - BUILD
AWFUL - SMELL
BENEATH - BELOW
GRAIN - CORN
TRUST - LOYAL
CONTEXT - CLUE
POUND - WEIGHT
THIRD - SECOND
DIAMETER - CIRCUMFERENCE
DRILL - TOOL
PROPERTY - MINE
JOINT - BONE

Note. The first and second pairs could serve as Original Encoding Control or Interference
pairs or Interpolated Encoding Interference pairs. The Interpolated Control pairs
remained static across the conditions.
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Probability of Recall
Hypothesis 1 under Aim 3 predicted typical memory effects for both prediction
types; specifically, that probability of recall would be better for full than divided attention
and for the control than interference conditions. To test Hypothesis 1, a 2 (Attention: full,
divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference) repeated-measures ANOVA
was conducted for the DJOL condition on probability of recall. Table 19 shows the
experimental means for these conditions.
Table 19
Experimental Means for Probability of Recall for the DJOL Condition using the Standard
Test
Standard Test

MOT

Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
.75 (.04)
.67 (.05)
Interference
.45 (.03)
.39 (.04)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
.71 (.04)
.57 (.04)

Divided
Attention
.61 (.04)
.39 (.04)

There was no difference in probability of recall between the full (M = .59, SE =
.03) and divided (M = .53, SE = .04) attention conditions, F(1, 41) = 1.88, p = .18, ηp2 =
.002. This result is in contrast to both Experiment 1 and the MOT results above. As
predicted, probability of recall was significantly better for the control (M = .71, SE = .03)
than the interference (M = .42, SE = .03) condition, F(1, 41) = 86.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .68.
This finding, showed in Figure 11, replicated Experiment 1 and the MOT results for the
DJOL condition.
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Figure 11.

Probability of recall for the DJOL condition using the standard test.

Probability of recall for the MOT included for comparison.
Metamemory Sensitivity
Hypothesis 2 under Aim 3 predicted that because DJOLs are influenced by the
retrieval factor and not the encoding factor, there would be no differences between the
Attention conditions for DJOLs. Furthermore, DJOL predictions were expected to be
higher for the interference than control condition as Experiment 1 and previous research
(e.g., Eakin, 2005) has found. Specifically, when multiple targets are paired with a single
cue as they are in the interference condition, participants have more information about
those pairs to use to make their predictions, resulting in higher predictions for the
interference than the control condition in which only one target is paired with a cue.
Table 20 contains the experimental condition means for the DJOL condition.
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Table 20
Experimental Means for Metamemory Sensitivity for the DJOL Condition using the
Standard Test
Standard Test

MOT

Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
50.13 (5.67)
54.10 (6.45)
Interference 79.58 (3.99)
78.82 (4.54)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
53.68 (6.48)
56.55 (6.57)

Divided
Attention
50.57 (6.18)
58.11 (6.27)

Supporting Hypothesis 2 under Aim 3, DJOL magnitude did not differ between
the full (M = 64.86, SE = 4.17) and divided (M = 66.46, SE = 4.75) attention conditions,
F(1, 37) = 0.06, p = .80, ηp2 = .002, as shown in Figure 12. For the Attention conditions,
metamemory tracked memory such that both probability of recall and metamemory
predictions were statistically equal between the full and divided attention conditions.
These findings also replicate the MOT results and Experiment 1, demonstrating that on
the standard test, participants do not rely on the encoding factor when making DJOLs.
For the standard test, DJOLs were significantly higher for the interference (M =
79.20, SE = 3.02) than control (M = 52.12, SE = 4.29) condition, F(1, 37) = 48.50, p <
.001, ηp2 = .57, also depicted in Figure 12. These results show the classic dissociation
between memory and metamemory that is commonly found in retroactive interference
literature (e.g., Eakin, 2005); specifically, probability of recall was significantly better for
the control than interference condition, but metamemory predictions were significantly
higher for the interference than control condition. This result supports Hypothesis 2 and
replicates Experiment 1 but is different from the MOT results in Experiment 2. There was
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no significant interaction between the Attention and Retroactive Interference conditions,
F(1, 37) = 0.37, p = .55, ηp2 = .01.

Figure 12.

DJOL sensitivity for the DJOL condition using the standard test.

DJOL sensitivity for the MOT included for comparison.
Metamemory Accuracy
To test the hypotheses on metamemory accuracy, Goodman-Kruskal Gamma
correlations were calculated for each participant between recall accuracy and their
predictions. For the DJOL condition using the standard test, the overall gamma
correlation was .40, which was significantly greater than zero, t(40) = 6.56, p < .001.
Because the overall gamma correlation is greater than zero, ANOVAs examining the
gamma correlations can be conducted. The means for all experimental conditions are in
Table 21.

148

Table 21
Experimental Means for Metamemory Accuracy for the DJOL Condition using the
Standard Test
Standard Test

MOT

Full
Divided
Attention
Attention
Control
.64 (.08)
.64 (.10)
Interference
.41 (.13)
.41 (.15)
Note. Standard Error (SE) in parentheses.

Full
Attention
.54 (.12)
.48 (.13)

Divided
Attention
.58 (.11)
.45 (.12)

A 2 (Attention: full, divided) X 2 (Retroactive Interference: control, interference)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for the DJOL conditions on metamemory
accuracy as tested using gamma correlations. Hypothesis 4 under Aim 3 stated that for
the standard test, DJOL accuracy would not vary between the full and divided attention
conditions, but would be higher for the control than interference condition.
Supporting Hypothesis 4 under Aim 3, there were no differences in DJOL
accuracy between the full (M = .52, SE = .09) and divided (M = .53, SE = .10) attention
conditions, F(1, 33) = 0.0001, p = .98, ηp2 = .00001, and is shown in Figure 13. This
result supports the MOT findings above, as well as replicates Experiment 1. Further
supporting Hypothesis 4 under Aim 3, DJOL accuracy was significantly higher for the
control (M = .64, SE = .06) than the interference (M = .41, SE = .10) condition, F(1, 33) =
5.00, p = .03, ηp2 = .13, also replicating Experiment 1 and shown in Figure 13. The
interaction between Attention and Retroactive Interference was not significant, F(1, 33) =
.0003, p = .99, ηp2 = .000008.
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Figure 13.

DJOL accuracy for the DJOL condition using the standard test.

DJOL accuracy for the MOT included for comparison.
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